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ARTICLES
USING THE MASTER’S TOOL TO DISMANTLE HIS HOUSE:
DERRICK BELL, HERBERT WECHSLER,
AND CRITICAL LEGAL PROCESS

Will Rhee*
This Article retells the life stories of Derrick Bell, a founder of
Critical Race Theory, and Herbert Wechsler, a founder of the Legal Process
School, to suggest a synthesis of their often conflicting paradigms—Critical
Legal Process. Critical Legal Process’s fundamental question is whether the
Master’s tool, the so-called rule of law, can be considered—in the words of
Wechsler’s most famous article—a genuine “neutral principle.” Can the
Master’s favorite tool be repurposed to dismantle the very house it built? Can
the same rule of law that was abused to build the racist Jim Crow system not
only dismantle that explicitly racist system but also lessen further racism
moving forward? Bell would answer “No.” Wechsler would answer with a
resounding “Yes.”
Bell and Wechsler offer merging and mirror images of Critical Legal
Process’s critique of the rule of law. Both famously criticized Brown v. Board
of Education, the U.S. Supreme Court opinion popularly celebrated for
catalyzing the dismantling of the American apartheid system. Both began
their respective legal careers as insider liberal civil rights reformers. Both
served as federal civil government lawyers in the U.S. Department of Justice.
When asked to renounce his two-dollar membership in the National
Association for the Advancement of Colored People, Bell refused and left
Justice. Rejecting Bell’s uncompromising approach, Wechsler
unapologetically and successfully argued Korematsu, the infamous U.S.
Supreme Court case that upheld the World War II internment of Japanese*
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Americans.
Although Bell later renounced his insider status to become an
outsider protester who rejected the rule of law, Wechsler maintained his
steadfast belief in incremental, insider liberal legal reform to improve the
rule of law. Bell’s own fictitious story about a lawyer named Erika Wechsler,
the daughter of a liberal civil rights law professor, and her White Citizens
for Black Survival organization, proposes how Critical Legal Process could
synthesize Bell’s critical deconstructive and Wechsler’s transformative
reconstructive legacies of the rule of law.
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INTRODUCTION
This Article retells the life stories of Derrick Bell, a founder of
Critical Race Theory,1 and Herbert Wechsler, a founder of the Legal Process
School,2 to suggest a synthesis of their often conflicting paradigms—Critical
Legal Process.3 As a “Critical” movement, Critical Legal Process argues that,
in every democracy, there is a privileged, ruling elite class who seeks to
maintain the status quo. Audre Lorde elegantly articulated one view of this
elite:
Those of us who stand outside the circle of this society’s
definition of acceptable . . . those of us who have been forged
in the crucible of difference . . . know that . . . the master’s
tools will never dismantle the master’s house. They may allow
us temporarily to beat him at his own game, but they will
never enable us to bring about genuine change.4
Consistent with Lorde’s words,5 this Article shall refer to that ruling
elite as the “Master.”6 Critical Legal Process also argues that the Master’s
1

Derrick Albert Bell was born on November 6, 1930, and died on October 5, 2011. The Early
Years: The Making of the Intellectual and the Activist, DERRICK BELL OFFICIAL SITE,
http://professorderrickbell.com/about/ (last visited Feb. 9, 2018).
2
Herbert Wechsler died on April 26, 2000. Henry Paul Monaghan, A Legal Giant Is Dead,
100 COLUM. L. REV. 1370, 1370 (2000).
3
See infra Part IV for further discussion. Critical Legal Process follows in the footsteps of
other critical jurisprudential hybrids such as Critical Race Realism and Critical Race
Feminism. See generally DERRICK BELL, CRITICAL RACE FEMINISM: A READER (Adrien
Katherine Wing, ed., 1997); CRITICAL RACE REALISM: INTERSECTIONS OF PSYCHOLOGY,
RACE, AND LAW (Gregory S. Parks et al. eds., 2008).
As Angela Harris astutely observed, “A beginning word of caution: essays like this one
inevitably indulge in the anthropomorphic fallacy, creating a unified thinking and speaking
subject where none exists.” Angela P. Harris, Foreword: The Jurisprudence of
Reconstruction, 82 CALIF. L. REV. 741, 744 (1994). As a hybrid of critical theory and the
so-called Legal Process School, Critical Legal Process assumes consensus over what
constitutes critical theory and the Legal Process School. Although oversimplified,
jurisprudential labels nevertheless do make theoretical concepts easier to understand and
provide convenient shorthand for analysis.
4
AUDRE LORDE, SISTER OUTSIDER 112 (1996); accord DERRICK A. BELL, Bluebeard’s
Castle: An American Fairy Tale, in AFROLANTICA LEGACIES 157–58 (1998) (analogizing
U.S. racism against black Americans to the French fairy tale Bluebeard’s Castle); see also
Richard Delgado, Derrick Bell’s Toolkit--Fit to Dismantle That Famous House?, 75 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 283, 286–87 (2000) (recognizing Bell’s analogy to Bluebeard’s Castle).
5
LORDE, supra note 4.
6
See Lisa C. Ikemoto, Traces of the Master Narrative in the Story of African
American/Korean American Conflict: How We Constructed “Los Angeles,” 66 S. CAL. L.
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favorite tool to reinforce its power and privilege is the rule of law—the “often
used but difficult to define”7 bedrock assumption of classical liberal
democracy that everyone is equally subject to an objective, fair, publicly
promulgated written law.8 That written law, the “Master’s house,” is legal
doctrine—the black-letter law in the books employed daily by lawmakers to
keep a democracy functioning.9 Legal doctrine is what is taught in traditional
law school courses and tested on the Bar examination.10
Bell and Wechsler offer merging and mirror images of Critical Legal
Process’s critique of the rule of law. Both famously criticized11 Brown v.
Board of Education,12 the U.S. Supreme Court opinion still popularly
celebrated as a triumph of the rule of law for catalyzing the dismantling of
the American apartheid system.13 Both began their respective legal careers as
insider liberal civil rights reformers.14 Both served as government lawyers in
the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ).15 When asked to renounce his $2
membership in the National Association for the Advancement of Colored
People (NAACP), Bell refused and left the DOJ.16 Rejecting Bell’s
uncompromising approach, Wechsler unapologetically and successfully
argued Korematsu, the infamous U.S. Supreme Court case17 that upheld the
World War II internment of Japanese-Americans.18
Although Bell later renounced his insider status to become an outsider
REV. 1581, 1582 (1993) (“I use ‘master narrative’ to describe white supremacy’s
prescriptive, conflict-constructing power, which deploys exclusionary concepts of race and
privilege in ways that maintain intergroup conflict.”) (footnote omitted).
7
Part 1: What is the Rule of Law, A.B.A. DIV. FOR PUB. EDUC. 4, https://www.american
bar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/publiced/features/Part1DialogueROL.authcheckdam.pdf
(last visited Dec. 31, 2017).
8
Will Rhee, Law and Practice, 9 LEGAL COMM. & RHETORIC: JALWD 273, 293–94 (2012).
9
Id. at 294.
10
Id.
11
Bell and Wechsler both published their critiques of Brown in the Harvard Law Review.
See Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence
Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518 (1980); Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of
Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1959).
12
Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), enforced, Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S.
294 (1955). See infra notes 63–69, 333–85, and accompanying text.
13
See infra notes 62–64 and accompanying text.
14
See infra Parts II.A and III.A.
15
See infra notes 101–07, 268–312, and accompanying text.
16
See infra Part II.A.
17
See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
18
Id.
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protester who rejected the rule of law,19 Wechsler maintained his steadfast
belief in incremental, insider liberal legal reform to improve the rule of law.20
Wechsler’s proudest achievement, the American Law Institute’s Model Penal
Code,21 remains perhaps the greatest example of such incremental insider
reform.22
As explained in Part I, Critical Legal Process’s fundamental question
remains whether the so-called rule of law can be considered—in the words
of Wechsler’s most famous article—a genuine “neutral principle.”23 Can the
Master’s favorite tool be repurposed to dismantle the very house it built? Can
the same rule of law the Master used to build the racist Jim Crow system later
serve to dismantle that system and lessen further racism in the future? Bell
would answer “No.” Wechsler would answer with a resounding “Yes.” 24
In Part II, Bell’s life story chronicles how he came to believe that only
the Master can control the rule of law. Although Bell agrees with Lorde that
the Master’s favorite tool will never dismantle his house, Bell does so
unwillingly, wistfully wishing that he could believe again in insider legal
reform.25 Despite Bell’s uncompromising criticism of legal doctrine, his legal
narratives are nevertheless full of hypothetical legal doctrine.26 Conceding
his proposed legal doctrine’s radicalism, Bell never expected policymakers
to take his hypothetical legal doctrine seriously.27 Instead, the primary
purpose of Bell’s legal doctrine was critical deconstruction.28 He used this
vehicle to express his views satirically, more like a thought experiment
intended to help the Master see another point of view rather than to trigger
genuine legal reform.
Although Wechsler agreed with Bell that the Master’s favorite tool
had built the Master’s house, as explained in Part III, the clear purpose of
19

See infra Part II.C.
See infra Part III.
21
THE AM. LAW INST., MODEL PENAL CODE: OFFICIAL DRAFT AND EXPLANATORY NOTES
(1965); see infra notes 422–26 and accompanying text.
22
See infra notes 422–24 and accompanying text.
23
See generally Wechsler, supra note 11.
24
See infra Parts II and III.
25
See infra Part II.B.
26
See infra notes 145–77 and accompanying text.
27
See infra notes 143–44 and accompanying text.
28
Derrick A. Bell, Who’s Afraid of Critical Race Theory?, 1995 U. ILL. L. REV. 893, 899
(1995). (emphasis added).
20
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Wechsler’s proposed legal doctrine was the transformative reconstruction29
of flawed legal doctrine for genuine, albeit imperfect, legal reform.
Like Bell, Wechsler also authored hypothetical legal doctrine, but did
so from his position as a respected legal insider.30 Whereas Bell’s
hypothetical legal doctrine lay embedded in his fictional critical race
stories,31 Wechsler’s hypothetical legal doctrine was published by the
preeminent blue chip legal think tank, the American Law Institute (ALI).32
Unlike Bell, however, Wechsler not only expected the Master to take his
hypothetical legal doctrine seriously, but also witnessed the Master
celebrating and officially adopting it during Wechsler’s legal career.33
Finally, in Part IV, this Article employs Bell’s own fanciful story
about a lawyer named Erika Wechsler, the daughter of a liberal civil rights
law professor,34 and her White Citizens for Black Survival organization,35 to
propose how Critical Legal Process could synthesize Bell’s critical
deconstructive and Weschler’s transformative reconstructive legacies of the
rule of law.36
I. THE MASTER’S FAVORITE TOOL IS THE RULE OF LAW
The Master’s favorite tool, the means by which privileged, entrenched
elites maintain their power, is the rule of law.37 A democratic government
uses the rule of law, backed by the government’s coercive force, to compel
29

Id. (emphasis added).
See infra Part III.
31
See infra notes 143–44 and accompanying text.
32
The American Law Institute bills itself as “the leading independent organization in the
United States producing scholarly work to clarify, modernize, and improve the law.” About
ALI, ALI, https://www.ali.org/about-ali/ (last visited Feb. 6, 2018). Chief Justice Berger
concurred, stating that the ALI under Wechsler’s leadership was “at the forefront of
improvement in American Law.” Warren E. Burger, Dedication, Herbert Wechsler, 78
COLUM. L. REV. 951, 951 (1978).
33
See infra Part III.B.
34
Derrick Bell, Divining a Racial Realism Theory, in FACES AT THE BOTTOM OF THE WELL:
THE PERMANENCE OF RACISM 91–92 (1992).
35
Id. at 93.
36
See infra Part IV.
37
This assumption underpinned the Critical Legal Studies (CLS) movement. CLS’s
“central descriptive message” is “that legal ideals are manipulable and that law serves to
legitimate existing maldistributions of wealth and power.” Mari J. Matsuda, Looking to the
Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations, 22 HARV. CIV. RTS.-CIV. LIBR. L. REV.
323, 327 (1987). See also ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, THE CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES
MOVEMENT: ANOTHER TIME, A GREATER TASK 52–56 (Verso 2015) (1983).
30
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its citizens to obey the Master’s house: legal doctrine.38 Citizens who do not
comply face state-enforced monetary penalties, physical harm, or
incarceration.39
The rule of law, however, is not the only tool in the Master’s toolkit.
Oligarchic and dictatorial Masters have long eschewed the rule of law for the
rule of people,40 where the lawmaker’s unfettered personal discretion
regulated human behavior.41 One of the supposed hallmarks of the rule of
law, however, is that no one is supposed to be above the rule of law.42
A.

A Tool for All or Only the Master?

The rule of law’s claim to neutrality and objectivity that transcends,
or at least cabins, a lawmaker’s individual discretion remains one of its most
fundamental and appealing attributes. In the Massachusetts Constitution,
John Adams famously declared “a government of laws and not of men.”43
Thomas Paine in Common Sense concurred: “For as in absolute governments
the king is law, so in free countries the law ought to be king; and there ought
to be no other.”44 More cynically, Antole France quipped “majestic equality
of the laws, which forbid rich and poor alike to sleep under the bridges, to
beg in the streets, and to steal their bread.”45 Today, the American Bar
Association’s (ABA) Rule of Law Initiative seeks to promote the so-called
rule of law throughout the world.46 Founded by a past ABA President,47 the
World Justice Project annually calculates an empirical Rule of Law ranking
38

In this Article’s extended analogy, if the rule of law is the Master’s tool, that tool is used
to build the Master’s house—legal doctrine.
39
As Robert Cover famously observed, “Legal interpretive acts signal and occasion the
imposition of violence upon others . . . .” Robert M. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE
L.J. 1601, 1601 (1986); see also Richard Delgado, Law’s Violence: Derrick Bell’s Next
Article, 75 U. PITT. L. REV. 435, 437 (2014).
40
Rhee, supra note 8, at 292 n.121.
41
See, e.g., William C. Whitford, The Rule of Law, 2000 WIS. L. REV. 723, 724 (2000).
42
Id.
43
MASS. CONST., Part The First, art. XXX.
44
THOMAS PAINE, Common Sense, in COMMON SENSE AND OTHER POLITICAL WRITINGS 32
(Nelson F. Adkins, ed., The Liberal Arts Press, Inc. 1953) (emphasis in original).
45
ANTOLE FRANCE, THE RED LILY 95 (Winifred Stephens trans., 7th ed. 1922).
46
ABA Rule of Law Initiative, A.B.A., https://www.americanbar.org/advocacy/rule_of_law
.html (last visited Feb. 6, 2018).
47
About Us, WORLD JUST. PROJECT, https://worldjusticeproject.org/about-us (last visited
Feb. 6, 2018) (stating that the Project was “[f]ounded by William H. Neukom in 2006 as a
presidential initiative of the American Bar Association . . . .”).
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of nations.48
The rule of law and its primary product, legal doctrine, are supposed
to trump the rule of people. Whether or not the rule of law actually does so,
however, is one of the key disagreements not only between Bell and Wechsler
but also within Critical Legal Process.49 Although Wechsler conceded that
legal doctrine “is intrinsically uncertain and unclear” and “is shaped as it is
applied,”50 he nevertheless believed that legal objectivity was a worthy goal
and that legal doctrine could be perfected to be more objective. 51 He claimed:
Objectivity is more or less possible for individuals and courts
and agencies and people and professors and lawyers. I think a
degree of objectivity is obtainable. . . . [W]e should be as
objective as we can be. It is not true that objectivity is
impossible, and it is not true, unfortunately, that it is ever
perfectly attained.52
Wechsler’s goal for legal doctrine was, quoting Max Radin, “[a] juster
justice, a more lawful law.”53
To Wechsler, essential to the never-ending pursuit of legal objectivity
was focusing on law’s means—or process—as opposed to its ends—or
motives—because such ends ultimately are subjective value choices:
[W]hat is likely to be unclear is whether the ultimate
propositions in ethics and politics, those which concern ends
rather than means, can reasonably be asserted as anything
more than . . . personal preference. If they can only be asserted
as . . . personal preference, it is impossible to evaluate law and
legal activity on any other ground than their conformity to the

48

What is the Rule of Law?, WORLD JUST. PROJECT, https://worldjusticeproject.org/aboutus/overview/what-rule-law (last visited Feb. 9, 2018). The United States was ranked 19th
overall out of 113 countries. United States, WORLD JUST. PROJECT: RULE OF LAW INDEX
2017-2018, http://data.worldjusticeproject.org/#/groups/USA (last visited Feb. 6, 2018). For
fundamental rights, the United States was ranked 26th out of 113 countries. Id.
49
See infra notes 143–46, 333–54, and accompanying text.
50
HERBERT WECHSLER, Some Issues for the Lawyer, in INTEGRITY AND COMPROMISE:
PROBLEMS OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE CONSCIENCE 119 (Robert M. MacIver ed., 1957).
51
Norman Silber & Geoffrey Miller, Toward “Neutral Principles” in the Law: Selections
From the Oral History of Herbert Wechsler, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 854, 929–30 (1993).
52
Id.
53
Max Radin, A Juster Justice, A More Lawful Law, in LEGAL ESSAYS IN TRIBUTE TO ORRIN
KIP MCMURRAY 537 (Max Radin & A. M. Kidd eds., 1935).
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personal desires of the individual who makes the judgment.54
In opposition, Bell ultimately rejected Wechsler’s means–ends distinction
as a false dichotomy. To Bell, legal doctrine’s ends were what really
mattered. As a Critical Race Theorist,55 Bell ignored Wechsler’s stillpopular view that legal doctrine “should be objective and not take sides”
by asserting that “racism is both wrong and the greatest barrier to
54

JEROME MICHAEL & HERBERT WECHSLER, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS ADMINISTRATION:
CASES, STATUTES AND COMMENTARIES 5 (1940). Wechsler and his co-author Michael also
favorably quoted economist Paul Sweezy to assert that arguing over subjective ends was
counterproductive: “Underlying conceptions of good and evil, it has been frequently
observed, do not constitute a fruitful subject of controversy. These are matters of taste which
it is best to leave for the individual to work out for himself as best he can.” Id. at 5 n.5.
(quoting Paul M. Sweezy, Leviathan and the People, 53 HARV. L. REV. 1064, 1064 (1940)
(book review)). Wechsler considered Jerome Michael, another Professor at Columbia Law
School, an extremely influential mentor. Silber & Miller, supra note 51, at 863. Michael had
taught Wechsler as a law student. Id. Wechsler and Michael co-authored Criminal Law and
Its Administration, one of the most influential American criminal law casebooks. Louis B.
Schwartz, The Wechslerian Revolution in Criminal Law and Administration, 78 COLUM. L.
REV. 1159, 1159 (1978). In his memorial to his “anti-positivist” friend a year before Brown
was decided, Wechsler articulated Michael’s belief that principles could transcend legal
doctrine and that legal knowledge was significant only if it brought true understanding:
For . . . Michael was above all else a man of principle . . . and he devoted
a large portion of his energy to the refinement and articulation of the
principles that he avowed. . . . [He believed that] practice when it is
unprincipled is not alone incompetent—it is anarchical; that principle or
theory is, in this dimension, the communicable formulation of what
practice is about: its ends and means, its possibilities and difficulties, all
grasped through understanding the processes involved. . . . At all events,
he . . . [knew] that what law needs is more and better theory: for its making,
for its application, for its teaching and its practice.
...
[H]is vision of a legal subject had a scope far wider than the statement and
arrangement of existing law . . . and if the statement was confined to formal
rules he thought it very close to useless information. Such knowledge had
significance for him only if it was accompanied by understanding. And
understanding meant a deep appreciation of the problems that it is law’s
function to solve, the ends that should be sought in their solution and the
means that are adapted to such ends.
Herbert Wechsler et. al., Jerome Michael, 1890-1953, 53 COLUM. L. REV. 301, 301–02
(1953).
55
Starting with the Critical Legal Studies movement, many critical jurisprudential
movements have critiqued legal doctrine’s indeterminacy or masqueraded enforcement of
the status quo. See, e.g., MARK TUSHNET, RED, WHITE, AND BLUE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 46–60 (1988).
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realization of the nation’s often pledged but seldom realized ideals.”56 By
their actions, if not by their words, both Bell and Wechsler opposed the
Jim Crow apartheid system as racist and evil.
B.

Building the Master’s House.

As the legal doctrine of Jim Crow segregation demonstrated, and both
Bell and Wechsler agreed, the rule of law has indisputably been used in the
United States to build the white supremacist Master’s house. As early as
1934, Wechsler condemned the so-called rule of law’s acquiescence to the
unaccountable white mob lynchings of blacks.57 Three years later, he helped
represent a black Communist criminal defendant in front of the U.S. Supreme
Court.58 Bell called Wechsler “a frequent advocate for civil rights causes.”59
Bell of course dedicated his entire life to opposing the explicit and implicit
racism he saw in legal doctrine.60
C.

Dismantling the Master’s House?

Despite their well-documented opposition to Jim Crow apartheid,
both Bell and Wechsler nonetheless dared criticize that heroic legal talisman,
Brown v. Board of Education,61 lionized in an avalanche of scholarship and
56

DERRICK BELL & JOY RADICE, TEACHER’S MANUAL: RACE, RACISM, AND AMERICAN LAW
5 (6th ed. 2008) (on file with the Concordia Law Review).
57
See generally Herbert Wechsler, Book Review 44 YALE L.J. 191 (1934) (reviewing JAMES
HARMON CHADBOURN, LYNCHING AND THE LAW (1933) & ARTHUR FRANKLIN RAPER, THE
TRAGEDY OF LYNCHING (1933)). Even in 1934, Wechsler believed that law reform could and
must improve blacks’ Jim Crow oppression:
But the negro who succumbs to his terror must acquiesce in all the other
injustices perpetrated on his race, a result which should be abhorrent to the
dominant citizens of a civilized state. Whether he succumbs or not, it is
difficult to call him unreasonable if he embraces the conviction, shared by
many of his fellows, that his road to justice reaches beyond existing
governmental institutions. . . . It can be dispelled only by the creation of a
more abundant life for the negro . . . to make possible such a life is the job
of government.
Id. at 192 (footnote omitted).
58
See generally Herndon v. Georgia, 295 U.S. 441 (1935); see also supra notes 267–68 and
accompanying text.
59
Bell, supra note 11, at 519.
60
See, e.g., Margalynne J. Armstrong & Stephanie M. Wildman, An Homage to Derrick Bell,
36 SEATTLE U. L. REV. v, v–vi (2013).
61
Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), enforced, Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S.
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popular acclaim.62 More than sixty years later, Brown is still credited with
symbolically,63 if not substantively,64 dismantling the Master’s Jim Crow
house. Whereas Wechsler essentially criticized Brown for placing ends over
means,65 Bell criticized Brown because it reinforced the false belief that the
rule of law or any other means could ever change the United States’
permanently racist ends.66
After becoming disillusioned with the rule of law’s unfulfilled
promises, Bell came to agree with Lorde that the rule of law could never be
used to dismantle the Master’s house.67 Like many critical jurisprudential
movements, Bell concluded that the rule of law was the Master’s favorite tool
precisely because its powerful myth of neutrality, objectivity, and legalism
cleverly camouflaged the Master’s actual oppression.68 One of Bell’s seminar
students summarized Lorde’s point so well that Bell later published it.69 She
articulated a “self-protectionism” theory, wherein the Master “structure[s]
distribution of power and resources to protect [his] own social status and
control.”70 This self-protectionism theory, she posited, is at the heart of many
forms of discrimination, including racism.71 Bell’s most famous
manifestation of the self-protection theory is his pessimistic Racial Realism
Rule:
[R]acism is not going to go away. Rather, racism is an integral,
permanent, and indestructible component of this society.
Because this is true . . . [b]lack people will never achieve full
294 (1955).
62
See Matthew E. K. Hall, Bringing Down Brown: Super Precedents, Myths of Rediscovery,
and the Retroactive Canonization of Brown v. Board of Education, 18 J.L. & POL’Y 655,
659–60 (2010); see generally MARTHA MINOW, IN BROWN’S WAKE: LEGACIES OF
AMERICA’S EDUCATIONAL LANDMARK 6 (2010) (describing the desegregation effects of
Brown on the education system).
63
See Jim Hilbert, Restoring the Promise of Brown: Using State Constitutional Law to
Challenge School Segregation, 46 J.L. & EDUC. 1, 5 (2017).
64
Id.
65
Wechsler, supra note 11, at 26–27.
66
Bell, supra note 11, at 519.
67
See Rhee, supra note 8, at 292.
68
Id.
69
Derrick A. Bell et al., Racial Reflections: Dialogues in the Direction of Liberation, 37
UCLA L. REV. 1037, 1047–49 (1990) (referring to “Scapegoats for Self-Protection” by
Suzanne Goldberg).
70
Id. at 1048.
71
Id.
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equality in this country. . . . Even those . . . successful [efforts]
will produce no more than temporary “peaks of progress,”
short-lived [periods of improved conditions] that slide into
irrelevance as racial patterns adapt in ways that maintain white
dominance.72
Bell’s permanent racism thesis predictably “provoked cries of outrage and
condemnation as being too cynical.”73 Although these skeptics considered
Bell’s radical deconstruction unpersuasive, they might still be receptive
to Wechsler’s transformative reconstruction.74
By accepting racism’s permanence, Bell finds transformative
reconstruction of legal doctrine to be impossible. His critical deconstruction
of legal doctrine, however, might improve black conditions, remind the
Master that blacks are willing to fight, and provide blacks with meaning and
hope through future struggle.75
72

Derrick Bell, The Racism is Permanent Thesis: Courageous Revelation or Unconscious
Denial of Racial Genocide, 22 CAP. U. L. REV. 571, 573 (1993) (quoting DERRICK A. BELL,
FACES AT THE BOTTOM OF THE WELL: THE PERMANENCE OF RACISM 12 (1992)). Bell
frequently cites Jennifer Hochschild’s reexamination of Gunnar Myrdal’s famous “anomaly
thesis” in The American Dilemma. Id. at 577. Myrdal believed that “[r]acism was simply an
anomaly in a society committed to equality, the reparable failure of liberal democratic
practices to coincide with liberal democratic theory . . . .” Bell, supra note 69, at 1051.
Hochschild reexamined Myrdal’s anomaly thesis and concluded that “[L]iberal democracy
and racism in the United States are historically, even inherently, reinforcing; American
society as we know it exists only because of its foundation in racially based slavery, and it
thrives only because racial discrimination continues. The apparent anomaly is an actual
symbiosis.” JENNIFER L. HOCHSCHILD, THE NEW AMERICAN DILEMMA: LIBERAL
DEMOCRACY AND SCHOOL DESEGREGATION 5 (1984).
73
THE DERRICK BELL READER 8 (Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic eds., 2005).
74
See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
75
Derrick Bell, Racial Realism, 24 CONN. L. REV. 363, 378 (1992).
While implementing Racial Realism we must simultaneously
acknowledge that our actions are not likely to lead to transcendent change
and, despite our best efforts, may be of more help to the system we despise
than to the victims of that system we are trying to help. Nevertheless, our
realization, and the dedication based on that realization, can lead to policy
positions and campaigns that are less likely to worsen conditions for those
we are trying to help, and will be more likely to remind those in power that
there are imaginative, unabashed risk-takers who refuse to be trammeled
upon. Yet confrontation with our oppressors is not our sole reason for
engaging in Racial Realism. Continued struggle can bring about
unexpected benefits and gains that in themselves justify continued
endeavor. The fight in itself has meaning and should give us hope for the
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II. DERRICK BELL’S CRITICAL DECONSTRUCTION OF LEGAL DOCTRINE
“Bell has pioneered at least three areas of scholarship: critical race
theory, narrative scholarship, and economic-determinist analysis of racial
history.”76 Throughout his legal career, Derrick Bell had a tragic romance
with the Master’s tool—the rule of law—and the Master’s house, legal
doctrine.77 As a young law student and crusading civil rights lawyer, Bell
accepted classical liberalism’s faith in the rule of law.78 Like many civil rights
lawyers of his time, he initially considered Brown v. Board of Education to
be the rule of law’s penultimate triumph.79 But as he attempted to enforce
Brown’s legal doctrine upon recalcitrant, defiant school districts, Bell became
a disillusioned liberal. In the end, he saw the rule of law as an abuser that
took far more than it could give.80
Ultimately, Bell walked away from the rule of law. 81 He abandoned
incremental, insider legal reform as hopeless and instead embraced his
longstanding role as the perpetual outsider protester.82 Nevertheless, as Bell
admitted in interviews and demonstrated in his narrative dialogues with
supernatural civil rights lawyer Geneva Crenshaw,83 he continued to yearn
for the rule of law.84
Through hypothetical legal doctrine, Bell had his cake and ate it too.
As legal doctrine, it humored his continuing infatuation with the rule of law.
As a thought experiment, it also allowed him hypothetically to assume an
explicit acknowledgment of American racism and American white self-

future.
Id.
76
DERRICK BELL READER, supra note 73, at 14. One of his famous short stories, “Space
Traders,” even became a 1994 HBO movie. See Adrien Katherine Wing, Space Traders for
the Twenty-First Century, 11 BERKELEY J. AFR.-AM. L. & POL’Y 49, 57 n.46 (2009).
77
See infra Part II.A.
78
See infra Part II.A.
79
See infra Part II.A; see also DERRICK BELL READER, supra note 73, at 4 (stating that
“Brown remained Holy Writ”).
80
See infra notes 142–46 and accompanying text.
81
See Rhee, supra note 8, at 292.
82
See infra Part II.C.
83
Geneva Crenshaw represents the many strong black women Bell has known throughout
his life. DERRICK BELL, AFROLANTICA LEGACIES 83 (1998). See also infra note 160 and
accompanying text.
84
See infra Part II.B.
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protectionism,85 which Bell himself admitted was unlikely in real life.86
Finally, Bell’s hypothetical legal doctrine remains a masterful example of
Critical Legal Process’s critical deconstruction of legal doctrine. 87
A.

Disillusioned Classical Liberal to Outsider Protester

Bell entered the University of Pittsburgh School of Law in 1954, 88
the year the U.S. Supreme Court issued its celebrated Brown I opinion.89 He
graduated in 1957, the only black student in his 140-student class and one of
only three black students in the entire school.90 Before law school, he had
literally soldiered for the United States as an Air Force lieutenant from 1952–
54.91 While a law student, he was an associate editor of the University of
Pittsburgh Law Review.92 Richard Thornburgh, future Republican Attorney
General and Governor of Pennsylvania, was one of Bell’s fellow editors.93
Despite their ideological differences, they remained cordial for the rest of
their lives.94
All of Bell’s early articles exhibited masterful analysis of legal
doctrine.95 Throughout law school, he believed “that the Brown decision
marked the beginning of the end of Jim Crow oppression in all its myriad
forms.”96 Bell submitted so much writing on racial issues that the Law
Review’s faculty advisor asked him whether he wanted to change the Law
85

See infra notes 154–87 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Eric Ilhyung Lee, Nomination of Derrick A. Bell, Jr. to be an Associate Justice
of the Supreme Court of the United States: The Chronicles of a Civil Rights Activist, 22 OHIO
N.U. L. REV. 363 (1995) (imagining how the U.S. Senate would react to Bell’s hypothetical
legal doctrine during Supreme Court confirmation hearings); see also infra notes 153–54 and
accompanying text.
87
See Bell, supra note 28 and accompanying text.
88
See DERRICK BELL OFFICIAL SITE, supra note 1.
89
Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S.483 (1954).
90
See DERRICK BELL OFFICIAL SITE, supra note 1.
91
See Id.
92
Janet Dewart Bell, In Memory of Professor Derrick Bell, 36 SEATTLE U. L. REV. i, i (2013).
93
Id.
94
Id.
95
See generally Derrick A. Bell, Jr., The Girard Will Case—a Charitable Trust Faces the
Fourteenth Amendment, 18 U. PITT. L. REV. 620 (1957); Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Pennsylvania
Fair Employment Practice Act, 17 U. PITT. L. REV. 438 (1956); T. Oscar Smith & Derrick
A. Bell, The Conscientious-Objector Program—A Search for Sincerity, 19 U. PITT. L. REV.
695 (1958).
96
DERRICK BELL, SILENT COVENANTS: BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND THE
UNFULFILLED HOPES FOR RACIAL REFORM 2 (2004).
86
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Review’s name to the University of Pittsburgh Civil Rights Journal.97
Upon meeting his hero, the first black federal judge, Judge William
H. Hastie, Bell told Hastie that he wanted to become a civil rights lawyer.98
Reflecting the naïveté of early civil rights advocates still reveling in Brown,
Hastie replied, “Son, I am afraid that you were born fifteen years too late to
have a career in civil rights.”99 After Brown’s issuance, Bell’s future NAACP
boss Thurgood Marshall reportedly said that it would take about five years to
implement Brown and that all racial segregation would be eliminated by
1963.100 “For the first decade of my legal career,” wrote Bell, “I, like most
civil professionals, believed with an almost religious passion that the Brown
decision was the equivalent of the Holy Grail of racial justice.”101
Despite Judge Hastie’s admonition, Bell became a civil rights lawyer
out of law school.102 Selected for the prestigious DOJ Honors Program, he
transferred a year later to the new Civil Rights Division.103 In a formalist
move, of which Herbert Wechsler might approve,104 Bell’s superiors asked
Bell to end his $2 NAACP membership.105 His superiors probably recognized
that the NAACP was a private advocacy organization that was often a party
in Civil Rights Division cases. Because Bell, as a DOJ attorney, represented
the United States’ interests—and not any particular interest group—in federal
court, Bell’s superiors presumably and understandably believed such
membership would appear to be a conflict of interest, indicative of a possible
lack of neutrality or objectivity.106 Even though the DOJ and NAACP had
often worked together in early civil rights cases, they would go on to oppose
each other in federal court in the future.107
97

Id.
Id. at 3.
99
Id.
100
GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HALLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE?
43 (1991).
101
BELL, supra note 96, at 3.
102
Id.
103
See DERRICK BELL OFFICIAL SITE, supra note 1.
104
See infra Part III.B.
105
DERRICK BELL, CONFRONTING AUTHORITY: REFLECTIONS OF AN ARDENT PROTESTER 18
(1994).
106
Id.
107
See, e.g., Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457 (1982); Clifford Freed,
Ethical Considerations for the Justice Department When It Switches Sides During Litigation,
7 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 405 (1984).
98

16

CONCORDIA LAW REVIEW

Vol. 3

Wechsler probably would have cancelled his membership to maintain the
formal appearance of neutrality. Because of his penchant for not inquiring
into motives or specific circumstances when determining neutrality,108
Wechsler might analogize Bell’s NAACP membership to another DOJ
attorney’s membership in a white supremacist organization. To Bell,
however, motives and circumstances mattered.109 Starting a pugnacious
pattern of protest that would characterize his entire legal career,110 Bell
refused to cancel his NAACP membership.111 As a result, Bell’s supervisors
moved Bell’s desk out of his office into the hallway and reduced his
caseload.112 Rather than renounce his NAACP membership, Bell resigned
from the DOJ.113
After leaving the DOJ, Bell worked for the local Pittsburgh chapter
of the NAACP.114 Thurgood Marshall, then-Director of the NAACP Legal
Defense Fund (LDF), met Bell in Pittsburgh.115 Having heard about Bell’s
DOJ resignation, Marshall offered Bell a job to work with him at the LDF.
Bell “accepted on the spot.”116 From 1960 to 1966, Bell supervised more than
300 LDF school desegregation cases.117 At the LDF, he worked with Medgar
Evers (up until his murder), Thurgood Marshall, Jack Greenberg, Robert
Carter, and Constance Baker Motley.118
Foreshadowing his future identity as a perpetual protester, in 1961,
Bell mistakenly made a public telephone call in a whites-only railroad station
waiting room in Jackson, Mississippi.119 White police officers arrested him
and put him in jail overnight.120 Fortunately, a local black lawyer bailed him
108

See WECHSLER, supra note 50.
For example, with his Race, Racism, and American Law casebook, Bell rejected “the view
that law school texts should be objective and not take sides. Rather, the book’s point of
departure is that racism is both wrong and the greatest barrier to realization of the nation’s
often pledged but seldom realized ideals.” BELL & RADICE, supra note 56.
110
See infra Part II.C.
111
DERRICK BELL OFFICIAL SITE, supra note 1.
112
Id.
113
Id.
114
Id.
115
Id.
116
Id.
117
Id.
118
Id.
119
DERRICK BELL, ETHICAL AMBITION: LIVING A LIFE OF MEANING AND WORTH 30 (2002).
120
Id.
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out the next day.121 When Bell returned to LDF headquarters in New York,
Thurgood Marshall prophetically lectured Bell: “Damn, boy, the black folks
down South need good lawyering. They don’t need dead heroes. They got
plenty of them already. Understand? Do your protesting in the courtroom,
not in the railroad station.”122
From 1966 to 1968, Bell continued his school desegregation work as
Deputy Director, Office of Civil Rights, U.S. Department of Health,
Education, and Welfare (the institutional precursor to the U.S. Department of
Education).123 Bell started teaching law in 1969, when he began to reflect on
and write about his school desegregation practice experience.124 He became
the first Executive Director of the Western Center on Law and Poverty at the
University of Southern California Law School.125 With the race riots after Dr.
Martin Luther King, Jr.’s assassination in 1968, progressive law schools
scrambled to hire black faculty.126 In 1969, Harvard Law School hired Bell
to be, as Bell recounted the dean’s words, “the first, but not the last black”
faculty member.127
At that time, Bell admitted that he remained a classical liberal, but a
disillusioned one:
By this point, my enthusiasm for gaining compliance with
Brown through court orders requiring the balancing of races
for each school had waned with experience. Brown remained
Holy Writ, but I now felt we were misreading its message. As
happens all too often in religion, disciples lose sight of the
basic truths amid all the doctrines that tend to stifle those
truths rather than nourish them.128
With the benefit of time and space as a law professor to reflect on his
desegregation practice experience, Bell turned away from his classical liberal
roots. Of Bell’s many publications, two in particular illustrate his about-face
from the classical liberal rule of law. In the first article, Serving Two Masters:
121

Id.
Id. at 31 (emphasis added).
123
DERRICK BELL OFFICIAL SITE, supra note 1.
124
Id.
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Id.
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DERRICK BELL READER, supra note 73, at 5–6.
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Id. at 6.
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BELL, supra note 96, at 4.
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Integration Ideals and Client Interests in School Desegregation Litigation,
Bell attacked a classical liberal rule of law stronghold, public interest
litigation, by accusing public interest legal organizations like the LDF of
suffering from a conflict of interest in impact litigation.129 Because public
interest legal organizations ultimately want to change the law, the would-be
law reformers’ objectives might be different than their actual clients’
objectives.130 While impact litigators might want a particular outcome to setup the next lawsuit, their clients might prefer more pedestrian relief that better
improves their lives but does not provide the desired legal precedent.131
In a published response to Bell’s article, LDF General Counsel
Nathaniel Jones was furious. He characterized Bell’s “indictment of civil
rights lawyers (and the NAACP)” as claiming that “civil rights lawyers have
failed adequately to represent the interests of children in segregated schools
and thus violated their ethical responsibilities to their clients.”132 Jones
concluded that Bell’s article lacked “analytical and factual precision” and
“comprehensiveness.”133
Although Bell had alienated many of his former civil rights colleagues
with his first article, his second article ignited a firestorm of opprobrium
because, like Wechsler before him, Bell dared attack the sanctity of Brown.
In Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence Dilemma, Bell
first articulated what would later be known as the Interest-Convergence
Thesis.134
The Interest-Convergence Thesis was Bell’s attempt to meet
Wechsler’s challenge, to articulate Brown’s neutral principle, and to explain
“on a positivistic level—how the world is.”135 The Interest-Convergence
Thesis has been applied to a variety of different contexts, including other
129

Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client Interests in
School Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470, 472–73 (1976).
130
Id. at 477–78.
131
Id. at 471–72.
132
Nathaniel R. Jones, Correspondence: School Desegregation, 86 YALE L.J. 378, 379
(1976).
133
Id. at 381.
134
See generally Bell, supra note 11; see also Kevin Hopkins, Back to Afrolantica: A Legacy
of (Black) Perseverance?, 24 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 447, 466 (1998) (“No matter
how justified by the racial injustices they are intended to remedy, civil rights policies,
including affirmative action, are implemented for blacks only when they further interests of
whites.”).
135
Bell, supra note 11, at 523.
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minority race rights, non-Christian religious rights, educational reform,
pension reform, animal rights, domestic violence, concentrated poverty, and
the war on terror.136 A more generic statement of the Thesis might be: a
capitalist democracy adopts legal doctrine with the express purpose to assist
marginalized people only if such doctrine actually furthers the Master’s
interests.
With his published criticism of Brown and his claim that racism is a
permanent part of American society,137 Bell had become disillusioned with
the liberal ideal of the rule of law. Bell later wrote about how traditional ruleof-law civil rights lawsuits were actually counterproductive:
We learned the hard way that commitment to white
dominance could both survive official segregation and gain in
effectiveness under the equal opportunity standard we civil
rights lawyers had urged on courts and the country. . . . Thus,
rather than eliminate racial discrimination, civil rights laws
have only driven it underground, where it flourishes even
more effectively. Given the intransigence of discrimination,
civil rights campaigns aimed at changing the rules, without
affecting the underlying status quo, have proved
counterproductive even when their original goals were
achieved.138
Although Bell had stopped his earlier romance with the Master’s rule
of law and the Master’s house, legal doctrine, he remained ambivalent.
Ironically, his pining for the rule of law and legal doctrine manifested itself
not in court filings or official legal doctrine but rather through his outsider
narrative scholarship.
B.

Lingering Legal Doctrinalist

Despite his well-established mistrust of the rule of law and legal
doctrine, Bell nevertheless created hypothetical legal doctrine in his narrative
stories. He concluded that the rule of law “seeks to convey an objectivity that
may exist in theory but is impossible in the real world.”139 Likewise, Bell

136

See Justin Driver, Rethinking the Interest-Convergence Thesis, 105 NW. U.L. REV. 149,
155 (2011).
137
Bell, supra note 11, at 522–23.
138
BELL, supra note 105, at 149–50 (emphasis added).
139
BELL & RADICE, supra note 56, at 11.
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considered legal doctrine extremely indeterminate, asserting that the
“instability and malleability of legal doctrine renders certainty a myth and
stare decisis a fiction.”140
Yet when writing his modern-day race-law parables, Bell decided to
continue to explore rule-of-law and legal doctrinal themes. Many of his
narrative stories involved dialogues between Bell and his supernatural former
civil rights colleague Geneva Crenshaw, named in honor of “many black
women [Bell had] known and learned from during [his] life.”141 Bell
explained that in spite of his skepticism, in his stories, Derrick Bell the
character would continue to represent the classical liberal rule-of-law
position, a position Crenshaw was happy to undermine:
[Geneva Crenshaw] has strange, really sort of superhuman,
powers of insight with regard to race. I, as the narrator dealing
with her, take a more conventional civil-rights lawyer
approach: “We need to continue following litigation,” and she
tells me that’s crazy. . . . [I]t reflects the ambivalence that—
that I feel and I think that a lot of blacks feel. We’re in this
transitional era, in which I can’t claim that I’ve totally lost my
sense that the answer is one more lawsuit and—and one more
traditional effort to get civil-rights legislation passed.142
Bell therefore created hypothetical legal doctrine to implement his
racism-is-permanent neutral principle. He recognized that policymakers
might not listen to him or care about his doctrinal proposals.143 Like the
biblical prophet Jeremiah, Bell’s hypothetical legal doctrine served as a
jeremiad “calling for the nation to repent.”144 Here are some examples of
140

Id. at 14.
BELL, supra note 83, at 83.
142
Interview by Brian Lamb with Derrick Bell, Author (Nov. 15, 1992), http://www.book
notes.org/Watch /34630-1/Derrick-Bell.aspx.
143
See, e.g., BELL, supra note 83, at 33–35 (acknowledging that “it sure is tough trying to
resist oppression with words and ideas” and that “it’s hard to imagine how more of our
writings can halt or even hinder the hostile forces arrayed against our people.”).
144
Bell’s exchange with Geneva Crenshaw in Faces at the Bottom of the Well: The
Permanence of Racism demonstrated his awareness:
141

“In other words,” I [Bell] suggested when she looked up, “we’re a race of
Jeremiahs, prophets calling for the nation to repent.” “Exactly!” Geneva
said. “And you know what nations do to their prophets?” “I do. About the
least dire fate for a prophet is that one preaches, and no one listens; that
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Bell’s critical deconstructionist legal doctrine (with brief explanations):


Interest-Convergence Thesis. As previously explained,145 this thesis
assumes that the U.S. legal system will adopt legal doctrine ostensibly to
remedy black injustice only when such doctrine would also further white
interests.146



Revisionist Brown opinion (What Brown Should Have Said). Nine famed
academics were asked the following: “How would you have written the
Brown opinion in 1954, if you knew then what you know now about the
subsequent history of the country and the progress of race relations in the
past half century?”147 The nine academics simulated the U.S. Supreme
Court. Not surprisingly, Justice Bell authored a dissenting opinion
because the “Court’s long-overdue findings that Negroes are harmed by
racial segregation is, regrettably, unaccompanied by an understanding of
the economic, political, and psychological advantages whites gain
because of that harm.”148



Racial Fortuity Corollary. Bell later expanded his Interest-Convergence
Thesis to cover minority groups more broadly where racial minorities are
only incidental or fortuitous third-party beneficiaries of racial policies,
without the ability to enforce those policies.149



Racial Preference Licensing Act (RPLA) (the Final Civil Rights Act).150
With the RPLA, the United States, according to Bell, would finally
acknowledge the reality of de facto discrimination against blacks by
one risks all to speak the truth, and nobody cares.”

Derrick Bell, Racism’s Secret Bonding, in FACES AT THE BOTTOM OF THE WELL: THE
PERMANENCE OF RACISM 157 (1992). A number of commentators have called Bell’s work a
jeremiad. See, e.g., Marcus Bruce, “The Promise of American Life”: Derrick Bell, Critical
Race Theory, and the American Jeremiad, in FOLKWAYS AND LAW WAYS: LAW IN
AMERICAN STUDIES 165 (Helle Porsdam ed., 2001); Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic,
Derrick Bell’s Chronicle of the Space Traders: Would the U.S. Sacrifice People of Color if
the Price Were Right?, 62 U. COLO. L. REV. 321, 329 (1991); George H. Taylor, Racism as
“The Nation’s Crucial Sin”: Theology and Derrick Bell, 9 MICH. J. RACE & L. 269, 288–89
(2004).
145
See supra notes 134–35 and accompanying text.
146
Hopkins, supra note 134.
147
WHAT BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION SHOULD HAVE SAID: THE NATION’S TOP LEGAL
EXPERTS REWRITE AMERICA’S LANDMARK CIVIL RIGHTS DECISION ix (Jack Balkin et al.
eds., 2002).
148
Id. at 185.
149
BELL, supra note 96, at 69–70.
150
Derrick Bell, Foreword: The Final Civil Rights Act, 79 CALIF. L. REV. 597 (1991).
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allowing “all employers, proprietors of public facilities, and owners and
managers of dwelling places” actual license to discriminate against blacks
by paying a fee and a quarterly tax.151 The RPLA’s proceeds would be
placed in an “‘equality fund’ used to underwrite black businesses, offer
no-interest mortgage loans for black home buyers, and provide
scholarships for black students seeking college and vocational
education.”152 Bell worked out a burden-shifting proof scheme for
discrimination claims against RPLA license holders and even authored a
racially realistic presidential signing statement.153


Freedom of Employment Act.154 This federal law would “ban[] all
affirmative action programs” and “assume[] that all persons who, because
of their race or ethnicity, were actual or potential beneficiaries of
affirmative action policies obtained the positions they now hold
unfairly.”155



Ultimate Voting Rights Act.156 The No Taxation Without Representation
Voter Bill157 would create a special Voter Travel Fund from half of
campaign contributions to cover voting-related travel expenses and
mandate that racial minorities would be able “to elect representatives of
their choice in numbers equal to their portion of the population eligible to
vote.”158



Rules of Race Relations Law.159 Another restatement of the InterestConvergence Thesis160 and Racial Realism Rule161 into two Rules. The
first Rule of Race Relations Law is as follows:
Racial remedies are the outward manifestations of unspoken
and perhaps unconscious conclusions that such remedies—if
adopted—will secure, advance, or at least not harm the

151

Id. at 600–02.
Id. at 601.
153
Id. at 601–02.
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Derrick Bell, The Freedom of Employment Act, NATION, May 23, 1994, at 708.
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88 (1987).
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Id. at 86.
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Id. at 87.
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See Bell, supra note 11, at 519. See also supra notes 134–35 and accompanying text.
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See Derrick Bell, The Racism Is Permanent Thesis: Courageous Revelation or
Unconscious Denial of Racial Genocide, 22 CAP. U. L. REV. 571 (1993).
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interests of whites in power.162
The second Rule is stated thus:
The benefits to blacks of civil rights policies are often
symbolic rather than substantive, and when the crisis that
prompted their enactment ends, they will infrequently be
enforced for blacks, though in altered interpretations they may
serve the needs of whites.163


Black Reparations Foundation.164 The richest white man in the world
would establish the Black Reparations Foundation, “whose simple
purpose is to bring economic justice today to the least fortunate of those
black people whose forebears were refused such justice after the Civil
War.”165 With anonymous contributions from other wealthy individuals,
the privately-funded Foundation would disperse over $25 billion (over $5
trillion in 2017 dollars) in grants to all American blacks “based on freeenterprise models in which monthly payments are a percentage of
currently earned income . . . carefully calibrated to reward enterprise and
discourage sloth.”166



Racial Toleration Laws.167 These state laws would “severely restrict[]—
and, in some states, ban[] outright—public teaching that promoted racial
hatred by focusing on the past strife between blacks and whites. Penalties
[would be] severe for leading or participating in unauthorized public
healing sessions, or for publicly wearing what the law termed ‘symbols
of racial hatred.’”168



Quality of Education Model Desegregation Plan. Perhaps Bell’s most
explicitly practical work was published in 1980 when Bell was Dean of
the University of Oregon Law School in an anthology he edited, Shades
of Brown: New Perspectives on School Desegregation.169 He explicitly
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stated that his audience was black parents whose children attended allblack schools and judges supervising school districts under court
desegregation orders with all-black schools.170 Echoing his later dissent
in a rewriting of the Brown opinion,171 Bell’s model plan explicitly stated
that its purpose should be “to bring minority schools up to the academic
standards of mainly white schools in the district.”172 He also included
summaries and citations of federal case law to prepare legal arguments in
support of such plans.173


Race, Racism, and American Law Casebook.174 Bell first authored this
unconventional constitutional law casebook in 1973.175 The casebook
used published legal doctrine, commentary, and hypothetical legal
doctrine to explore Bell’s long-time belief in the permanency of U.S.
racism.176 As Bell explained:
[His casebook’s] approach was unorthodox, particularly in its
departure from the view that law school texts should be
objective and not take sides. Rather, the book’s point of
departure is that racism is both wrong and the greatest barrier
to realization of the nation’s often pledged but seldom realized
ideals. The challenge of the book and for those who adopt it
to teach courses on racial discrimination is to explore the
history of racism, examine its current methods of functioning,
and perhaps grasp the factors contributing to its resilience to
reform.177

It is not surprising that Bell wrote all of this hypothetical legal doctrine
outside of the traditional legal system. Even after he left his civil rights
practice to become a law professor, Bell remained a perpetual outsider–
protester in the Academy.
C.

Perpetual Outsider Protester
When Bell chose to resign from the DOJ rather than renounce his $2

Truths, in SHADES OF BROWN: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON SCHOOL DESEGREGATION 124
(Derrick Bell ed., 1980).
170
Id.
171
WHAT BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION SHOULD HAVE SAID, supra note 147, at 185.
172
Bell, supra note 169, at 130.
173
Id.
174
DERRICK BELL, RACE, RACISM, AND AMERICAN LAW xix (6th ed. 2008).
175
Id.
176
See supra notes 146–51 and accompanying text.
177
BELL & RADICE, supra note 56, at 5.

2018

USING THE MASTER’S TOOL

25

NAACP membership, he set the tone for the rest of his legal career. As a legal
academic, he tried unsuccessfully to be an insider incrementalist and
subsequently embraced his outsider protester role. Like Gandhi178 and Martin
Luther King, Jr.179 before him, Bell understood that when seeking to change
society, the rule of law was a clumsy and unreliable tool.
Like Gandhi and King, Bell understood that public protest could be a
much more effective tool to change perceived unjust policies for two reasons.
First, public protest put the contested policy under public scrutiny and forced
the Master to justify the policy publically.180 Moreover, if the protester
happened to be a visible member of the community, as Bell’s hero Hastie was
during World War II as the highest black War Department official 181 and as
Bell was as the first black tenured professor at Harvard Law School and the
first black dean of the University of Oregon Law School,182 then the Master
might be forced to make changes to save face. Hastie’s protest undoubtedly
contributed to President Truman’s Executive Order 9981 abolishing
segregation in the armed forces.183 Likewise, Bell’s protest undoubtedly
contributed to the much higher number of minority and women faculty at
Harvard Law and Oregon Law today.184
Second, unlike a classical liberal or armchair academic, the protester
shares the same suffering that the people for whom she is protesting
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experience.185 The protester’s injury is not hypothetical or abstract. The
protester’s injury is real life. By resigning in protest, both Hastie and Bell
gave up excellent jobs for the unknown. They risked their families’ welfare.
When Bell took an unpaid leave of absence from Harvard Law School until
it hired its first woman-of-color tenure-track professor, his wife, Jewel, was
battling cancer.186 She died three months later.187
Even before his disillusionment, Bell felt uncomfortable when he was
lauded as a brave, crusading civil rights lawyer because his sacrifice paled in
comparison to “what [his] black clients had to deal with every day.”188
Thurgood Marshall, who earlier had told Bell to save his protesting for the
courtroom and not the real world,189 also understood that as a traditional
lawyer he did not share his client’s suffering. When his biographer Carl
Rowan praised Marshall for his courage, Marshall retorted: “You forget just
one little fucking thing. I go into these places and I come out, on the fastest
vehicle moving. The brave blacks are the ones who have to live there after I
leave.”190
As Bell’s second wife Janet reflected, Bell “understood the parallels
between his work as a civil rights attorney and his support for student
demands for diversity. He did not protest for the sake of protesting. Nor did
he shy away from taking principled, sometimes public and controversial,
stands.”191 With the benefit of hindsight, Bell later reflected: “Had I
understood before accepting Harvard’s offer how ingrained the hiring and
tenure practices are, I likely would not have taken the job.”192
When first hired in 1968, Bell understood that Harvard would be
hiring additional tenure-track black faculty after him.193 After six years of
watching highly qualified black candidates never receive an offer for a
tenure-track position at Harvard, Bell wrote an open letter in 1974 to Harvard
Law School Dean Albert Sacks, copying all the Harvard faculty, where Bell
185
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declared that he would resign at the end of the year unless Harvard hired
another black faculty member.194 A few months later, Harvard hired its
second black male faculty member.195 Dean Sacks made sure to inform Bell
that his letter had nothing to do with the hiring.196 A few years later, Harvard
hired its third black male faculty member.197
With Wechsler, Dean Albert Sacks is considered one of LPS’s
founding fathers.198 Bell ironically offered Sacks as an example of how the
credentials required by the academic Master “strongly correlate to upperclass standing.”199 Sacks, along with Henry Hart, Jr.—Wechsler’s Federal
Courts co-author and another LPS founding father—never published their
Legal Process casebook.200 Although the Legal Process School takes its name
from Hart and Sacks’ book, the book was only published posthumously. Bell
believed that Sacks, perhaps like Wechsler, benefited from white privilege:
I don’t think [any of the Harvard Law faculty] cared that
[Sacks] never published a book. There was a consensus: Al
Sacks could do it if he wanted to. That was enough. The same
acceptance was extended to several other [white] faculty
members whose scholarly promise far exceeded their
performance.201
Needless to say, Bell did not believe that non-white faculty like himself
would be given the same benefit of the doubt by his white colleagues.202
Five years later, in 1979, Bell decided to try his hand at the Master’s
game. He applied to be Dean of the University of Oregon Law School.203 In
1980, he was offered the job.204 Recognizing potential obstacles, Bell urged
the faculty to consider the significance of “hiring a black man committed to
194
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civil rights to head a mainly white law school in a state with no more than
one or two percent black citizens. ‘We are ready,’ they assured me.”205 Bell
accepted the job and served as Oregon Law’s dean from 1980 to 1986.206 He
resigned in 1986 to protest the faculty’s unwillingness to hire an AsianAmerican woman.207 She had been ranked third behind two white males.208
When the two white males rejected Oregon’s offers, a few professors
convinced a majority of the faculty that “we could do better.”209 As a result,
the faculty refused to give an offer to the Asian-American woman, electing
instead to reopen the search.210 Bell admitted that he resigned out of
“frustration, rather than any good judgment or political sense.”211
Bell then visited at Stanford Law School to teach Constitutional Law,
a required first-year course.212 As he had done at several other law schools,
Bell used an unconventional pedagogical method, critiquing American
constitutional law through a racial and socioeconomic lens.213 He later
learned from the local Black Law Students Association (BLSA) that about 24
of his students had started attending other Constitutional Law sections with
the instructors’ approval.214 Instead of telling the students to give Bell a
chance, these two faculty members had secretly accepted the students’
criticisms of Bell’s teaching ability without giving Bell an opportunity to
respond.215 To make matters worse, a faculty member had invited Bell to
speak at a public lecture series secretly designed to compensate for Bell’s
perceived teaching incompetence.216
The BLSA students told Bell that they were going to protest the
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lecture series as racist.217 He encouraged their protest.218 The student protest
led to the cancellation of the series and the return of the students who had
previously left Bell’s Constitutional Law section.219 Bell later wrote: “Even
some weeks after the event, I am unable to rationally express the range of my
feelings from abject humiliation to absolute outrage. . . . It was by a
considerable margin, the worst moment of my professional life.”220
After the BLSA protest publically shamed the Stanford faculty,
everyone involved apologized to Bell.221 Bell’s friend and, ironically, noted
LPS scholar Dean John Hart Ely222 apologized to Bell and urged him to forget
the incident.223 After some deliberation, Bell decided to forego leaving
quietly and instead protested the incident.224 He authored a description of the
incident in the Stanford Law School Journal entitled The Price and Pain of
Racial Perspective.225 He also mailed letters to other law school deans across
the country explaining what had happened to him and urging them to discuss
the incident at faculty meetings.226 Although initially defensive, Stanford
Law School eventually responded positively to Bell’s protest, holding a series
of town hall meetings to discuss the law school’s receptiveness to innovative
pedagogy, racial minorities, and diverse viewpoints.227
Bell then returned to Harvard Law School in 1987, where there were
now three other black male faculty but still no women of color on the
faculty.228 Harvard women-of-color law students then asked for Bell’s help
217
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to lobby Harvard Law to hire its first woman-of-color professor.229 Bell
became convinced that only a female law professor of color could provide
the needed unique intersecting perspective the students sought. 230 A man of
color or a white woman simply couldn’t provide the same perspective.231
Although a “few of his liberal colleagues” at Harvard “had told him, in
private, that they were with him . . . when it came time to vote, most
invariably melted away, switching sides or abstaining.”232 When the Harvard
faculty failed to extend an offer to a visiting professor, a talented black
woman who had taught during the 1989–1990 school year in a “look-see”
visit, Bell decided that he had to protest again.233 His biographers’ description
of Bell’s decision-making process highlights Bell’s preference for outsider
protest over insider incremental reform:
“Is it possible,” he muttered to himself, “that some of my
friends are right, and with almost fifteen years of service here,
I can do more working from within?” He smiled, recalling that
he had rejected similar advice more than thirty years earlier
when he had chosen to leave the Justice Department over its
ultimatum that he resign from the NAACP and that he had
asserted for years that civil rights lawyers and activists need
to stand ready to supplement petitions, lawsuits, and other
forms of polite supplication with street protests and other
forms of militancy. He turned to his computer and began
writing his speech to what he expected would be a large and
supportive gathering of students.234
In that 1990 speech, Bell announced that he would take an unpaid leave of
absence until Harvard hired its first woman-of-color law professor.235
His wife Jewel, seriously ill with breast cancer, did not oppose his
protest but “wondered why he was always the one who took risks to protest
what he considered racial injustices.”236 When Jewel died three months later,
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Bell “remained determined to see his battle through.”237 Because Harvard
limited faculty leaves of absence to two consecutive years, Bell ended up
giving up tenure at Harvard.238 In 1992, Harvard dismissed Bell from his
position as Weld Professor of Law.239 Harvard eventually hired a woman-ofcolor law professor in 1998.240
In the end, Bell perhaps found the perfect job where he could remain
the perpetual outsider. His former law student, John Sexton, was now Dean
of the New York University School of Law (NYU Law).241 Although Sexton
offered to have the NYU Law faculty vote to grant him tenure, Bell
declined.242 Instead, Bell signed a one-year contract as a visiting professor of
law.243 He would sign 18 more. For 19 years, from 1992 until his death in
2011, Bell remained a permanent visiting professor at NYU Law.244 As a
permanent visitor, Bell did not attend faculty meetings or participate in
faculty governance.245 This arrangement, admitted Bell, helped keep him out
of trouble.246 While Bell ended his life as a perpetual outsider, Wechsler lived
his entire life as the consummate insider.
III. HERBERT WECHSLER’S TRANSFORMATIVE RECONSTRUCTION OF LEGAL
DOCTRINE
Herbert Wechsler was one of the American legal profession’s elder
statesmen at the time upstart Crits like Bell started questioning the utility of
the rule of law and legal doctrine for marginalized people. Famed journalist
Anthony Lewis wrote of Wechsler: “There was a gravity about him, a sense
of sureness about the law.”247 Judge Richard Posner, himself one of
Wechsler’s critics, gave Wechsler quite a complement, writing that “there is
237
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no longer anyone in the legal profession who has the kind of stature that a
Wechsler achieved.”248 Orin Kerr claimed that a biography about Wechsler
would be an interesting and important scholarly contribution.249 Wechsler’s
famous Neutral Principles article250 remains the fifth most-cited law review
article of all time.251 Bell himself called Wechsler “an outstanding lawyer, a
frequent advocate for civil rights causes, and a scholar of prestige and
influence.”252
Wechsler may have been, as Posner claimed, one of the last traditional
guild masters who instructed lawyers and judges in the craft of legal
reasoning. Wechsler was “in the university but of the legal profession . . .
training the next generation of lawyers and through scholarship—through law
review articles, treatises, model laws, and restatements of the law—guiding
judges and practicing lawyers in the path of sound legal reasoning.”253
Throughout his legal career, Wechsler remained the consummate
incrementalist insider legal reformer.254 In particular, his co-authorship of the
most famous federal courts treatise, his service as Executive Director of the
ALI, which continues to create black-letter Restatements of the Law, and his
principal drafting of the Model Penal Code all demonstrate that he also was
a master of crafting, assessing, and revising legal doctrine.
A.

Incrementalist Insider Reformer

Wechsler graduated from Columbia Law School in 1931 at the age of
22. He had received his B.A. from the City College of New York at 19.256
He was Editor-in-Chief of the Columbia Law Review.257 Noted legal realist
255
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Karl Llewellyn taught Wechsler at Columbia.258 After graduating law school,
Wechsler clerked for U.S. Supreme Court Justice Harlan Fiske Stone from
1932 to 1933.259
During that clerkship, in the Columbia Law School faculty’s own
words, “questions of the scope of the Supreme Court’s power of
constitutional review were posed with a heated intensity never yet exceeded
in our history.”260 Among his many rule-of-law accomplishments, Justice
Stone later authored the famous Carolene Products Footnote Four, where in
dictum he articulated an elegant, specific application of Critical Legal
Process’s more general rule-of-law concern: “whether prejudice against
discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends
seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be
relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly
more searching judicial inquiry.”261 Amidst the racial strife of 1965,
Wechsler commented on Footnote Four: “Narrower scope, more exacting
judicial scrutiny indeed! What a change in the legal cosmos those few words
portended in the quarter century ahead!”262
Stone would also later author Hirabayashi v. United States, the U.S.
Supreme Court decision upholding the curfew of Japanese nationals.263 As a
government lawyer, Wechsler later would rely extensively upon Hirabayashi
when defending the Japanese internment in Korematsu.264
After completing his clerkship, Wechsler joined the Columbia Law
School faculty.265 He stayed at Columbia—taking extended leaves of absence
for public service—until his final retirement in 1992.266
Instead of rehashing his entire biography, this section will highlight
258
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Wechsler’s long interaction with subordinated minority groups. This
interaction consistently demonstrated his belief in incremental, insider legal
reform. During a time when support for civil rights causes was not
widespread, Wechsler showed great courage by authoring a Yale Law
Review article in 1934 advocating for federal anti-lynching legislation and
federal intervention in the South to assist blacks.267 He was unafraid of the
ire of white supremacists and anti-Communists alike when he represented
black Communist Angelo Herndon in Herndon v. Georgia, a case that
ultimately ended up in front of the U.S. Supreme Court.268
With the outbreak of World War II, Wechsler took a leave of absence
from Columbia to serve in the DOJ.269 His leave of absence for the federal
government totaled six years.270 In 1941, as an Assistant Attorney General,
he authored the United States’ Supreme Court brief in United States v.
Classic, a criminal prosecution of white election commissioners who
tampered with Democratic primary votes to favor white congressional
candidates.271
In light of the Classic opinion, the NAACP petitioned for the Court
to hear Smith v. Allwright.272 Thurgood Marshall thought that DOJ’s amicus
curiae support of the NAACP’s petition might persuade the Court to grant
their petition, so Marshall personally visited then-Attorney General Francis
Biddle and Biddle’s Assistant Attorney General Herbert Wechsler.273
Wechsler advised Biddle not to assist the NAACP because, among other
reasons, to do so would make the DOJ appear less neutral. As Wechsler
explained:
Well, I thought it over, . . . and my advice to Biddle was not
267
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to go in with Marshall. . . . I felt that if we came in with
Marshall and asked the Court to extend Classic, our role could
actually be hurtful. . . . We were a governmental department,
. . . and we had to get along with the Senate Judiciary
Committee, which was dominated by the Southerners—and
this seemed an unnecessary fight.274
Wechsler added that Marshall understood the DOJ’s political view and did
not protest their decision:
When I told Thurgood that the answer would be no, he took it
very well. He said, “I’m sorry, we’d like to have you with us,
but we’ll just have to go it alone. I see your position.” That
was one of his great virtues—seeing things from the other
fellow’s side. He was a good, tough advocate who functioned
without having to feel that his opponents were either knaves
or fools.275
Despite the DOJ’s unwillingness to support the LDF, the Supreme Court
nevertheless ended up granting certiorari in Allwright.276 Wechsler would
later name Allwright as another Supreme Court opinion, like Brown, where
he “with all sincerity” could not find “neutral principles that satisfy the mind”
to justify the results of which he otherwise approved.277
Wechsler and Marshall would spar again, on November 10, 1951,
when Wechsler helped moot the LDF’s Brown team on their Supreme Court
appellate strategy.278 Despite his withering criticism of Brown, Wechsler
made clear that he thought Brown‘s desegregation outcome had “the best
chance of making an enduring contribution to the quality of our society.”279
His belief in the justness of Brown‘s outcome was the reason Wechsler
decided to use Brown as “the hardest test of [his] belief in principled
adjudication.”280
The Columbia Law School faculty were actively involved in the
Brown litigation. In particular, both Charles Black, who joined the Columbia
Law faculty in 1947, and Jack Weinstein, who joined the Columbia Law
274
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faculty in 1952, were key members of the Brown team.281 Perhaps Black
coordinated the LDF moot court. Black later authored what may be the most
effective and most biting critique of “Neutral Principles”.282 Black’s valid
points notwithstanding, for the rest of his legal career, Wechsler remained
unpersuaded by all criticism, believing that he had effectively rebutted all
attacks.283 Weinstein would later be Of Counsel at the LDF,284 a federal
judge,285 and a renowned evidence scholar.286 One can only imagine what
debate their presence on the same law school faculty might have generated.
During that vigorous moot court, Wechsler’s criticism of the
NAACP’s legal strategy foreshadowed his later criticism of the Supreme
Court’s Brown opinion.287 He posited that “Plessy [v. Ferguson] had a certain
nagging ‘intellectual strength.’”288 Segregating blacks and whites, argued
Wechsler, is not a denial of equal protection because both races face similar
limitations on their liberty.289 Blacks cannot associate with whites but neither
can whites associate with blacks. How is that a denial of equal protection?
NAACP lawyer and future federal judge Robert Carter290 responded
“that segregated black and white children were not wronged equally.”291
Marshall continued that the Court would need to take judicial notice that
white communities had greater political and lawmaking powers than black

281

See Robert D. McFadden, Charles L. Black Jr., 85, Constitutional Law Expert Who Wrote
on Impeachment, Dies, N.Y. TIMES (May 8, 2001), http://www.nytimes.com/2001/05/08/ny
region/charles-l-black-jr-85-constitutional-law-expert-who-wrote-on-impeachmentdies.html; Judge Jack B. Weinstein, U.S. DISTRICT CT.: EASTERN DISTRICT OF N.Y., https://
www.nyed.uscourts.gov/content/judge-jack-b-weinstein (last visited Feb. 6,
2018).
282
See generally Charles L. Black, Jr., The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69
YALE L.J. 421 (1960).
283
Silber & Miller, supra note 51, at 927.
284
See WWII Profile: Jack B. Weinstein, U.S. CTS. (June 16, 2014), http://www.uscourts.gov
/news/2014/06/16/ wwii-profile-jack-b-weinstein.
285
See U.S. DISTRICT CT.: EASTERN DISTRICT OF N.Y., supra note 281.
286
See generally David L. Faigman & Claire Lesikar, Organized Common Sense: Some
Lessons from Judge Jack Weinstein’s Uncommonly Sensible Approach to Expert Evidence,
64 DEPAUL L. REV. 421 (2015) (referring to the Symposium in Honor of Judge Jack
Weinstein this piece was written for).
287
See supra notes 61–65, 334–87 and accompanying text.
288
See KLUGER, supra note 273, at 531.
289
Id.
290
Id. at 530.
291
Id.

2018

USING THE MASTER’S TOOL

37

communities, and that whites in fact imposed segregation on blacks.292
Apparently now willing to look beyond lofty principles to factual
reality, Wechsler asked—in an argument that echoed Bell’s later criticism of
Brown’s focus on integrating the races to the detriment of equal educational
opportunity293—whether a black child attending a segregated school was
worse off than a black child attending an integrated school where she might
feel the full brunt of white prejudice.294 What about the limited economic and
social opportunity of the wider de facto segregated world that awaited a black
student enrolled in an integrated school?
Psychologist Kenneth Clark responded: “Which is better—to be sick
or to be dead? Segregated school is a sort of fatality.”295 But, persisted
Wechsler, was a black child any more harmed in a segregated school than in
an overtly hostile white school?296 Clark then conceded Wechsler’s point.297
In its briefs and oral argument, the NAACP did not address Wechsler’s lofty
arguments.298 As a result, neither did the Supreme Court in its subsequent
Brown opinion.299
At the time of the moot, Wechsler had just stepped down as Assistant
Attorney General in charge of the DOJ’s War Division, where he supervised
the Japanese internment and martial law in Hawaii and argued Korematsu for
the United States in front of the U.S. Supreme Court.300 He later quipped that
“[t]hese were nice cases for testing the role of the government lawyer.”301 As
part of his duties, Wechsler also interacted with then-internment proponent
(and later U.S. Supreme Court Chief Justice) California Attorney General
Earl Warren.302
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Although the DOJ misled the Court in Korematsu,303 Wechsler
adamantly maintained that he never personally made any material
misrepresentations.304 But as the Assistant Attorney General in charge of the
War Department’s legal strategy, surely the buck and the blame should stop
with him. Given Wechsler’s civil rights bona fides, it was not surprising that
Wechsler admitted that he had been “deeply disturbed” by the imprisonment
of innocent Japanese-Americans into internment camps but at the time had
“put aside his personal feelings and performed his duty as a lawyer.”305 In
303
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his Neutral Principles article, Wechsler said that he thought the Japanese
internment was “an abomination when it happened, though in the line of duty
as a lawyer [he] participated in the effort to sustain it in the Court.”306
Speaking in front of the Jewish Theological Seminary of America, Wechsler,
a Jew, would later characterize the internment’s “relocation centers” as “what
in any fair estimate could be called concentration camps.” 307 “No one,” he
later said, “could have felt more distressed about [the internment’s] existence,
other than those personally affected by it, than I.”308
Perhaps indicating that he remained at peace with his “I was just
following orders” excuse, during a 1980 interview, Wechsler himself
volunteered the obvious questions: If he disagreed with the internment, why
did not he resign, and why did he cooperate with such manifest injustice?309
In Wechsler’s own words:
Now, the interesting question about all this that you should
ask yourself is really the resigning question. When is the right
thing to do to get out? Or to put it another way, when should
you feel compromised by participating at all in a proceeding
that may result in sustaining something that you would feel
regret about having sustained?
...
Should I have declined[?] . . . I might have done that. In fact,
however, I did not. I did superintend the preparation of that
brief. It presented the strongest arguments that I felt could be
made in support of the validity of the action taken by the
President.310
Wechsler’s answer to his own question echoed the core fiction of the
rule of law, the idea that compartmentalizing lawmaking by role, without
taking the overall motives or circumstances into account, would create a sense
of neutrality or objectivity.311 He managed to apply this legal fiction even to
his own personal decision-making:
You may ask why I did it. Of course, I could have resigned. .
306
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. . . I did it because it seemed to me that the separation of
function in society justified and, indeed, required the course
that I pursued; . . . one of the ways in which a rich society
avoids what might otherwise prove to be insoluble dilemmas
of choice is to recognize a separation of functions, a
distribution of responsibilities, with respect to problems of
that kind, and this is particularly recurrent in the legal
profession.312
The questions and answers to end this portion of the interview are
particularly instructive. Wechsler did not try to water down his own extreme
commitment, waffle on the decisiveness of his “insoluble dilemma[] of
choice,” or apologize for his actions.313 He understood that his choice was
dichotomous—either resign or be a loyal soldier:
Are you saying that the issue was either to resign or to carry
out the task?
Yes.
And there was no other middle ground?
What middle ground could there have been?
Was it ever a serious option for you? I mean, did you consider
the resignation option seriously?
No, I never considered it seriously. That was not my view.314
Compare Wechsler’s loyal devotion to duty over personal principle
with the way Bell and his hero William Hastie reacted to conflicts of
conscience.315 Despite his personal aversion to protest, Wechsler nevertheless
recognized that if “our system gives to dissidence no other institutional
avenue of expression,” then the only remaining active choice was “civil
disobedience subject to the charge of lawlessness and thus to ultimate
repression.”316 Wechsler also considered reason to be at the heart of protest,
observing that “a protest, [has] only such weight as [its] reasoning affords.”317
As he demonstrated first at the DOJ and time and time again as an academic,
Bell undoubtedly would have resigned from his position, if not engaged in an
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active protest.318
In addition to being the first black federal judge, Hastie was also the
Dean of Howard University School of Law, Special Adviser to the Secretary
of War, and Governor of the Virgin Islands.319 During World War II, Hastie
was the highest black civilian official in the War Department.320 As Louis
Pollak observed (the same Pollak who had opposed Wechsler’s criticism of
Brown),321 when faced with Wechsler’s dichotomy in 1943, Hastie chose to
resign on personal principle rather than collaborate with those who refused to
change an immoral discriminatory policy:
I would say a word about Hastie’s instinctive devotion to
principle. One of the earliest and most celebrated evidences of
Hastie’s stubborn integrity was his resignation, in the middle
of the war, from the highest civilian post to which a black had
been appointed—Special Adviser to Secretary Stimson.
Hastie’s quarrel was with the Air Force, which resolutely
continued to follow the flight patterns of Jim Crow. And the
best way Hastie knew to call attention to this festering wrong
was to remove himself from collaboration with those who had
authority to take corrective action.322
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The black press lauded Hastie’s resignation.323 In particular, W.E.B.
DuBois not only commended Hastie’s protest but also implicitly criticized
Wechsler’s insider choice:
There are two sorts of public relations officials in Washington
working on the situation of the Negro: one sort is a kind of
upper clerk who transmits to the public with such apologetic
airs as he can assume, the refusal of the department to follow
his advice or the advice of anyone else calculated to cease the
racial situation. The other kind of race relations official seeks
to give advice and to get the facts and if he receives a
reasonable amount of cooperation he works on hopeful. If he
does not, he withdraws. It is, of course, this second type of
official alone who is useful and valuable. The other is nothing.
Hastie belongs to the valuable sort and will not be easily
replaced.324
Five years after Hastie’s resignation, in 1948, segregation was abolished in
the U.S. military.325 At the end of the war, Wechsler served as Chief
Technical Adviser to the U.S. judges at the Nuremberg War Crimes
Tribunal.326
World War II ended.327 The Korean War came and went.328 The Cold
War began.329 Bell would later argue that the real reason for Brown was to
mask U.S. hypocrisy during the Cold War.330 It was hypocritical for the
United States to claim to champion freedom against communism overseas
while at the same time to maintain segregation at home.331 By providing
323
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Brown as a paper tiger with no enforcement, the United States could now
claim to have remedied its former hypocrisy while in actuality maintaining
blacks’ subordination.332
In 1959, five years after Brown I333 and a year after Cooper v. Aaron
(the only U.S. Supreme Court opinion signed by all nine Justices where the
Court reiterated the federal government’s supremacy over Arkansas’
executive and legislative resistance to Brown, and the Court’s power of
judicial review),334 Wechsler delivered the Holmes Lecture at Harvard Law
School, which became his Neutral Principles article published that same
year.335
Wechsler’s Neutral Principles article has been extensively analyzed
and critiqued elsewhere.336 This analysis only highlights the article’s
relevance to the rule of law. In the article, Wechsler wrote that the “main
qualities of law” were “its generality and its neutrality.”337 “A principled
decision . . . rests on reasons with respect to all the issues . . . reasons that in
their generality and their neutrality transcend any immediate result that is
involved.”338 Perhaps he best explained his “neutral principles” concept 20
years later: “I found myself developing the neutral principles ideas as a
pedagogical instrument for pushing students into subjecting their own
immediate reactions of approval or disapproval of the results of a particular
332
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decision to a more searching type of criterion of evaluation.”339
As Posner observed, Wechsler thus elevated a law school pedagogical
technique to a “methodological requirement of constitutional
adjudication.”340 A principle is neutral “only if it treats consistently not only
the case at hand but any hypothetical or actual case within the principle’s
semantic scope.”341 Such principles thus are an “appeal to reason—reason
stated in a principle fairly susceptible of general and neutral application.”342
The “real test” of such principles is “in the force of the analysis.”343 Wechsler
later clarified that his idea was not meant to provide a decision-making
formula but rather a test to confirm the decision-maker’s objectivity:
It is not, of course, thought of as a formula to guide or produce
the decision of hard cases, but rather as a negative test, a test
to be applied by a judge, with the essence of the question
whether he is being adequately consistent in the process of
adjudication, in reaching a particular type of result in a
particular type of case. That is to say, essentially that he ask
himself, “Would I reach the same result if the substantive
interests were otherwise?”344
In other words, neutral principles do not “dispense[] with the agony of
judgment in arriving at decisions.”345
Neutral principles, as Wechsler conceived them, were a fairly narrow
concept aimed at judges reviewing legislation.346 Wechsler conceded that his
article has been misunderstood to “seem[] [to] claim[] more for the neutral
principles concept than I ever undertook to claim for it.”347 Wechsler
continued: “I never quite had the missionary sense about that article that so
many people have kind of assumed I had. I didn’t have a sense that the ideas
that I was expressing had the novelty that some people think I thought they
had.”348 Wechsler added, “there was nothing novel in my insistence that the
339
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legitimacy of the decision is to be gauged in terms of the reasons given for
it.”349 He admitted that his “neutral principles” concept left “room for a much
broader exegesis” but explained that he simply had not had time to write
one.350 Wechsler never further elaborated on his “neutral principles” idea.
Nevertheless, his “neutral principles” meme has taken on a life of its own. As
Kent Greenawalt recognized, the concept of neutral principles in lawmaking
continues to have “enduring significance.”351
Greenawalt also recognized that Wechsler did not “mean to equate
principled decision with correct decision. . . . An opinion can be principled
but unsound in its interpretation of the Constitution.”352 Wechsler recognized
that much legal doctrine, particularly legal doctrine impacting previously
subordinated groups, involved value choices. As he wrote in Neutral
Principles, “some ordering of social values is essential . . . all cannot be given
equal weight.”353 Even if a judge must choose among constitutionally
protected values, she still should “give it an even-handed development” and
rely upon neutral principles when choosing.354 Wechsler believed that cynical
outcome-determinative lawmaking, where “you either like the results of
decisions or you don’t, appraising them in terms of your own values,”
doomed law to be no different than politics.355
One of the reasons Wechsler chose to criticize Brown was because he
wanted “to exhibit the tension between results and bases, in terms of
situations where [he] liked the result, but felt a moral obligation to question
the grounds.”356 His former student and colleague Justice Ruth Bader
Ginsburg explained that Wechsler’s point was “that the way we decide things
is . . . as important as what we decide.”357
Perhaps Wechsler’s most glaring error remains his disregard of his
349
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own white privilege358—a legitimate criticism of not only Wechsler but also
many normative reconstructionists,359 the rule of law concept, and legal
doctrine writ large.360 Similar to how white men often are blissfully unaware
that whiteness remains the silent default in American society,361 the Master
can remain ignorant of the fact that, by positivist and formalist default, the
rule of law reinforces preexisting legal doctrine.362
In his explanation of how he thought a personal anecdote illustrated
his freedom-of-association neutral principle for Brown, Wechsler
inadvertently revealed startling ignorance of his own white privilege. He had
befriended Howard University School of Law Dean Charles Hamilton
Houston. Houston was Hastie’s second cousin and had first brought Hastie to
Howard.363 Houston’s “lawyer as social engineer” statement represents the
pinnacle of the rule-of-law normative reconstructionist vision.364 Houston’s
famous words remain Howard Law’s school motto:
A lawyer’s either a social engineer or ... a parasite on society
... A social engineer [is] a highly skilled, perceptive, sensitive
lawyer who [understands] the Constitution of the United
States and [knows] how to explore its uses in the solving of
problems of local communities and in bettering conditions of
the underprivileged citizens.365
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Wechsler recalled Houston as “a charming, delightful man” who “seemed
moderate in his manner but his determination was evident.”366 In his Neutral
Principles article, Wechsler decided to use a spontaneous lunch with Houston
to illustrate his point: “In the days when I was joined with Charles H. Houston
in a litigation in the Supreme Court [in 1935] . . . he did not suffer more than
I in knowing that we had to go to Union Station to lunch together during the
recess.”367
Twenty years later, Wechsler explained that as he was hurrying out
from the U.S. Supreme Court building (then housed in the old Senate Office
Building), he bumped into Houston, who was there to file a petition for
rehearing.368 Wechsler explained: “I proposed that we have lunch in the
Capitol . . . and he said no, we couldn’t do that, but we might go over to Union
Station for a bite. I hadn’t realized.”369
Bell recognized that Wechsler remained painfully oblivious to the
obvious, that the Jim Crow system did not treat whites and blacks equally but
rather was designed to subjugate blacks in favor of whites. “To doubt,” Bell
wrote, “that racial segregation is harmful to blacks, and to suggest what
blacks really sought was the right to associate with whites, is to believe in a
world that does not exist now and could not possibly have existed then.”370
Only in a fantasy world of hypothetical assumptions and mind games
did Wechsler’s argument make sense. As Geoffrey Hazard observed, if blacks
have a right to associate with whites, then under neutral principles, whites
should have a right to associate with whites too.371 But then how could both
blacks and whites equally share a right of free association? The right to
associate freely with whom you choose also includes the right to exclude
those with whom you don’t wish to associate.372
While Wechsler’s argument was logical and might have made for a
good law school exam question, as Bell correctly recognized, the argument
had no basis in reality. The whole point of Jim Crow and slavery’s vestiges
366
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was to keep blacks subordinate and inferior to whites. Wechsler inexplicably
rejected this argument,373 going so far as to agree with Plessy that if blacks
felt inferior, “it is solely because [blacks] choose ‘to put that construction
upon it.’”374
Whites wanted to associate with whites because legal doctrine treated
whites as the Masters. Associating with whites meant receiving superior
goods and services. Associating with blacks meant receiving inferior goods
and services. Most blacks probably could have cared less about associating
with whites for whites’ sake. Blacks wanted to be treated the same as whites,
which meant having equal access to the same restaurants only open to whites.
The association with whites was only incidental to the better treatment.
Houston, as a black man, understood that he could not eat lunch at the
most convenient restaurant because blacks were legally forbidden from
eating there. Wechsler, however, had not realized that the best and most
convenient restaurants were limited only to whites. Blacks were relegated to
the train station. Like the rule of law, Wechsler may have had good intentions
in trying to break bread in public with a black man, but ended up spotlighting
his own foolishness. Under Wechsler’s own neutral principles logic, his good
intentions are not entitled to any weight or deference.375 Bell might have
observed that, like Wechsler, the rule of law has good intentions but remains
caught up in its own legal fictions and is thus ignorant about the real world.
As Bell recognized, the “equal” in “separate but equal” was a glaring
376
lie. Surely Wechsler was surrounded by ample evidence of this lie in
Washington, D.C., and New York City. How could Wechsler not notice it?
Wechsler was blind not only to segregation’s ugly realities but also to the
clear ludicrousness of his example. Someone with perhaps more selfawareness than Wechsler would have been ashamed to mention the anecdote
to anyone else. Anyone more reflective of their own privilege probably would
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not have drawn more attention to this embarrassing anecdote by mentioning
it at a high profile Holmes Lecture at Harvard and in a published attack on
the beloved Brown opinion.377
Ironically, Wechsler appeared to believe that the anecdote was selfevident not for the obvious proposition—that segregation mistreated blacks
more than whites—but for the ludicrous suggestion that Wechsler and
Houston were both equally inconvenienced at lunch. But Wechsler clearly
was not equally inconvenienced. As a white man, he could have eaten
anywhere. Notice also that Wechsler was not likewise excluded from the
Union Station restaurant. Even though a white man, he apparently could eat
at a blacks-only restaurant if he so desired.378
Houston however did not share Wechsler’s luxury. As a black man,
Houston was far more inconvenienced because the closest restaurant where
he could eat was much further for him than for Wechsler. Similar to how he
assumed equal inconvenience when none such existed, Wechsler assumed the
equality of segregated school facilities when he volunteered freedom of
association as a possible neutral principle to justify Brown’s result.379 But, as
Judge Carter had replied during their earlier moot court and Bell later
observed, there were no equal, segregated school facilities.380 Black school
facilities were always inferior to white ones. Wechsler was abstractly
assuming a ludicrous fantasy world.
A much better example of neutral principles in action was Wechsler’s
counsel to the U.S. judges at the Nuremburg War Crimes Tribunal. Wechsler
convinced the U.S. judges to use neutral principles to adjudicate accused
enemy war criminals. He encouraged U.S. judges to “judge the enemy only
by standards that we would apply to ourselves, be willing to apply to
ourselves, and feel obliged to apply to ourselves.”381 This “judge not lest thee
be judged”382 example makes much more sense than the example of lunch
with Houston.
377
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Twenty years later, Wechsler remained unrepentant. After rejecting
all criticisms of his article as illegitimate,383 Wechsler reiterated his same
freedom of association neutral principle:
It really seems to me that the point on segregation is
essentially that it’s a denial of liberty, and it’s a denial equally
of the liberty of whites to associate with blacks, if those are
the groups, and vice versa. . . . There isn’t anything in the
paper that I regret or would do differently now.384
Wechsler thus demonstrated that for all of his vaunted liberal sympathies, he
remained ignorant of—if not complicit with (recall Wechsler’s response to
Marshall in Allwright and his statement that he had to cooperate with ardent
racists)385—the white subjugation of blacks.
Perhaps the best response to Wechsler’s ridiculous false equivalence
was his faculty colleague Charles Black’s suggestion that we exercise one of
the “sovereign prerogatives of philosophers—that of laughter.”386 Black
correctly observed that “[w]hen the directive of equality cannot be followed
without displeasing the white, then something that can be called a ‘freedom’
of the white must be impaired.”387 As Kendall Thomas rightly recognized,
Wechsler’s associational argument ignored the distinction between some
whites who happen to be forced to interact with blacks in public having to
put up with “some disagreeableness”388 and the freedom of those same whites
not to interact with blacks “in the privacy of that white American’s home.”389
Despite Wechsler’s demonstrated lack of self-awareness, his core
argument that the rule of law must rely upon neutral principles that transcend
the immediate result remains legal doctrine’s unavoidable end goal in a
democracy.390 Transcendental reconstructionists continually ask, how can we
perfect or improve the neutral principles (or lack thereof) we have in our
383
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existing legal doctrine?391 Particular legal doctrine—like Jim Crow laws—is
bad law because it fails to exhibit neutral principles.
Four years after publishing Neutral Principles, in 1963, Wechsler
successfully argued New York Times Co. v. Sullivan on behalf of the New
York Times in front of the Supreme Court.392 In Sullivan, a Montgomery,
Alabama police commissioner, Sullivan, sued the New York Times in
calculated overreaction to a black civil rights fundraising advertisement in
the Times that misrepresented some minor facts.393 Sullivan made it clear that
citizens possessed a First Amendment right to criticize public officials.394
Perhaps the Times reflected their continued gratitude for Wechsler’s
exemplary advocacy when some 37 years later they called him a “Legal
Giant.”395
While Wechsler was finishing up Sullivan, he was asked to be the
Executive Director of the ALI.396 Wechsler’s legal career thus shifted from
legal practice attempting to improve legal doctrine incrementally to drafting
model legal doctrine to encourage legal reform.
B.

Master Doctrinalist

Throughout his legal career, Wechsler proved a master of legal
doctrine and a distinguished insider legal reformer. One of Wechsler’s “most
important” articles of faith was a surprisingly positivist and formalist view of
legal doctrine: “legal understanding is imperfectly attained, so long as law is
treated as an independent discipline consisting sole[l]y of an ordering of rules
and doctrines drawn from statutes and decisions.”397 He wrote treatises
summarizing legal doctrine, a myriad of model rules to improve legal
doctrine, and federal procedural rules to referee the federal doctrinal process.
Chief Justice Warren Burger explained that Wechsler “has contributed broad
perspective and constructive criticism, and his imprint is large on the fabric
of our system of law.”398
First, Wechsler authored two comprehensive treatises on legal
391
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doctrine, Criminal Law and Its Administration (with Jerome Michael),399 and
The Federal Courts and the Federal System (with fellow LPS founding father
Henry M. Hart, Jr.).400 Criminal Law has been called “the template for all
contemporary criminal law casebooks and perhaps the modern casebook
more generally.”401 When Wechsler joined the Columbia Law faculty in
1933, no course in criminal law was offered in the curriculum.402 Criminal
Law described “a process from police investigation to executive clemency”
by applying the “functional approach” to criminal law.403 Under that
approach, Michael and Wechsler asked “what our purposes are and whether
our means are well adapted to achieving those purposes.”404
Akhil Amar called The Federal Courts “beautiful and brilliant—
probably the most important and influential casebook ever written.” 405 The
casebook has remained acclaimed over three editions and more than four
decades.406 Chief Justice Warren Burger called The Federal Courts “an
essential tool for the practicing bar.”407
Second, Wechsler also was the chief reporter of the ALI’s Model
Penal Code and ALI’s Executive Director for 21 years, from 1962 to 1984.408
Chief Justice Burger characterized the ALI under Wechsler’s leadership as
being “at the forefront of improvement in American law.”409 As Wechsler
himself recognized, the ALI “has been engaged . . . in the restatement of the
common law and in preparing model legislation” and in so doing “has had
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enormous influence on the development of our law.”410 The ALI was founded
in 1923 as a permanent organization “to promote the clarification and
simplification of the law and its better adaption to social needs, to secure the
better administration of justice, and to carry on scholarly and scientific legal
work.”411 To accomplish this ambitious law reform mission, the ALI
publishes Restatements of the Law summarizing the common law, model
statutes, and commissioned law reform studies.412
Under Wechsler’s directorship, the ALI shifted from a more passive
reporting role to a more active law reform role.413 ALI’s First Restatement of
Law was just that, a descriptive restatement of American common law “stated
in the absence of a cleavage of authority and without assessment of the
influence that such decisions would or should exert on a contemporary
court.”414 The impetus of the change was the ALI’s approval of Section 402A
of Torts Restatement (Second), which adopted a strict liability rule for “any
product that is in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or
consumer or his property.”415 In response, the Defense Research Institute
(DRI) predictably criticized the ALI for adopting such a “minority” rule.416
The DRI remains, in the words of its mission statement, “the largest
international membership organization of attorneys defending the interests of
business and individuals in civil litigation.”417
In 1969, Wechsler decided to use the DRI’s criticism as a jumping off
point to explore the fundamental law reform question of “how far a judgment
as to what the law should be legitimately plays a part in reaching a decision
as to what it is.”418 He believed that the DRI’s criticism exhibited “too simple
an antithesis between an affirmation of what the law is and one as to what it
ought to be.”419 Instead, Wechsler challenged a purely positivist conception
410
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of legal doctrine:
I asked, therefore, if the statement of a rule does not involve
something more than the conclusion that it is supported by the
past decisions, for this is an implicit judgment that our courts
today would not perceive a change of situation calling for the
adaptation of the rule or even for a new departure. And if we
ask ourselves what courts will do in fact within an area, can
we divorce our answers wholly from our view of what they
ought to do, given the factors that appropriately influence their
judgments, under the prevailing view of the judicial
function?420
Under Wechsler’s direction, the ALI ultimately decided to “declare
the rule that an enlightened court faced with the question would announce”421
in its subsequent Restatements of Law. To aid the ALI in its model
rulemaking, Wechsler proposed “a working formula” that the ALI
unanimously approved: “we should feel obligated in our deliberations to give
weight to all of the considerations that the courts, under a proper view of the
judicial function, deem it right to weigh in theirs.”422
Wechsler recognized that this drafting change would permit “the
Restatements to attempt to be what they have been and are in fact—a modest
but essential aid in the improved analysis, clarification, unification, growth,
and adaptation of the common law.”423 Reflecting his scrupulous
unwillingness to inquire into motives or intentions,424 Wechsler was proud
that the ALI never lobbied to have its recommendations actually adopted by
lawmakers. Once their recommendations are published, the ALI’s role in law
reform is finished. They let “interested individuals or organizations who care
about the matter to do something about it.”425
At ALI, Wechsler’s proudest achievement426 was the completion of
the Model Penal Code (MPC).427 Sanford Kadish called Wechsler “a
420
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towering figure who, more than anyone else, made the study of criminal law
a respectable intellectual enterprise again” and “the latest in a tradition of
Anglo-American criminal law codifiers going back to Jeremy Bentham.”428
As the Code’s Reporter, Wechsler worked on the MPC from 1952 until the
MPC was adopted in 1962.429 The MPC, by his own admission, “absorbed
every bit of time and energy that [he] had.”430
Finally, Wechsler helped draft the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure and helped revise the Rules of Practice of the Supreme Court.431
He also was appointed to the President’s Commission on Law Enforcement
and the Administration of Justice.432
Although undoubtedly aware of Derrick Bell’s 1980 critique of his
Neutral Principles article published in the same Harvard Law Review,433
Wechsler remained defiantly unrepentant for the rest of his life.434
Nevertheless, could anything or anyone make unconvinced white men like
Wechsler change? Yes—their daughters.435
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IV. TOWARD CRITICAL LEGAL PROCESS: ERIKA WECHSLER AND WHITE
CITIZENS FOR BLACK SURVIVAL
Although there appears to be a great divide between Bell’s critical
deconstruction436 and Wechsler’s transformative reconstruction437 of legal
doctrine, Bell’s fictitious story involving Wechsler’s imaginary daughter
suggests common ground.438 The enlightened, white lawyer–revolutionary
Erika Wechsler, in Bell’s Faces at the Bottom of the Well,439 symbolizes
Critical Legal Process’s goals. She represents the perhaps tongue-in-cheek
hope for a remorseful Master, the dream that the powerful white majority
might not only understand the permanence of racism but also do something
about it. Like Critical Legal Process, Erika recognizes the danger of the rule
of law and the need to go beyond theoretical discussions to concrete action,
be it through legal process or revolution.
A.

The Story of the Remorseful Master.

In the story, Bell visits an Oregon national park with a light lunch and
his laptop computer to get some writing done amidst the beautiful trees.440
While Bell sits on a log typing away at his laptop, a bullet ricochets nearby.
The shooter, who apologizes for the near miss, is “a sturdy white woman,
probably in her mid-thirties . . . dressed in camouflage battle fatigues and . .
. a long-billed baseball cap over disheveled blonde hair” carrying a
semiautomatic rifle.441 She introduces herself as Erika Wechsler and politely
asks if she can join Bell.442
Erika immediately identifies Bell as “one of those civil-rights-lawyer
of Title IX’s co-sponsors, white male Senator Birch Bayh, recounted what his white father
told him: “He said, I’m going to testify before Congress. I’m going to tell them they need to
spend as much money on little girls for physical education as they do for little boys. Little
girls need strong bodies to carry their minds just like little boys do.” Aman Ali, The Father
of Title IX, WNBA, http://www.wnba.com/archive/wnba/features/the_father__title_ix_2012
_05_22.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2018).
436
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438
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types who believe it’s enough to rely on law to secure rights for [oppressed]
people”443 like her father Professor Wechsler:
My father was a law professor. You talk like he did. And it’s
obvious you’re as compulsive as he was, coming all the way
out here to work when any sensible person would be simply
enjoying the scenery. Plus, your folders read ‘Constitutional
Law class notes and Civil Rights seminar.’ I mean, how many
clues do I need?444
It turns out that Erika completed law school “for [her] father’s sake” even
though she “hated every minute” of law school and law practice as well.445
However, she remains “fascinated by law.”446
Surprised, Bell admits that he used to be a liberal law professor like
Wechsler: “Yes, that’s what I was—once. For years I believed law was the
answer, and I still teach law, including civil rights law.”447 He goes on to
explain his transition to Critical Race Theory: “Now, though, I’m convinced
that racism is a permanent part of the American landscape.”448 Bell then
emphasizes the rule of law’s continuing mythological power among
lawmakers and the public, pointing out that “as soon as [he] express[es] the
view that racism cannot be vanquished by the enactment and enforcement of
strong civil rights laws, most people conclude that [he has] given up, or
surrendered, or, worse, sold out.”449
Presciently, Erika identifies one of the key areas of disagreement
between Crits and liberal law reformers: tangible concrete action. Erika
responds: “But, Professor, you’re always dealing with theories and
abstractions. Many of the civil rights veterans you upset are committed
to the tangible, to what they see as real—including, paradoxically
enough, traditional symbols like racial justice, equal opportunity, even
integration.”450
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After further conversation, it is clear that Erika wholeheartedly agrees
with all of Bell’s scholarship and theory.451 Erika then tells Bell that her
“work could prove of great help” to him.452 She helped found “White Citizens
for Black Survival” (WCBS).453 WCBS’s program has two prongs. First, a
“racial realism” policy that largely parallels Bell’s pessimistic view of
racism’s permanence.454 Second, an “activist phase, in which we aim to build
a nationwide network of secret shelters to house and feed black people in the
event of a black holocaust or some other all-out attack on America’s historic
scapegoats.”455 Erika’s WCBS essentially embodies the remorseful Master:
[WCBS is] a collective of whites dedicated to doing what we
can to shield blacks from the worst dangers of racism. . . . To
last in WBCS, one must try to be as sensitive to racial
subordination as a member of the oppressor class can be:
aware of what went on in the past beyond history’s received
truths, and cognizant of the fact that slavery, for example, tried
to dehumanize blacks, and failed, and didn’t try to
dehumanize whites, but succeeded.
...
We . . . are determined to avoid in ourselves the oppressor’s
penalty. We try to understand contemporary racism and the
role it plays in American law, because law has always been a
powerful expression of ruling interests. We believe that
America’s race problem is a white problem. We have
determined to take personal responsibility.456
Erika recognizes that both classic liberals and Crits deny reality.457
“Advocates of liberal civil rights theory,” like her father, Herbert Wechsler,
“tend to deny [the] reality” of discrimination around them for fictions in legal
doctrine.458 Because she is a lawyer and Herbert Wechsler’s daughter, Erika
understands the rule of law and legal doctrine. She recognizes that her law
degree “gives [her] protection against” legal fictions like the rule of law’s
451
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objectivity.459
Many critical theorists like Bell, however, remain academic and
refuse to take their theories’ logic to their natural, practical conclusions.460
As Erika explains to Bell
New ideas always stir resistance. Look at your reaction to
WCBS’s mission to help black refugees in case of a general
racial attack. You think I’m crazy. I see it in your eyes, and
yet your view, that oppression on the basis of race is
permanent, renders such an attack not only possible, but
probable.461
To which Bell replies: “Which is why so many people reject it.”462
The supernaturally wise Geneva Crenshaw later admonishes Bell: “I
hope you took Erika’s message seriously. For all the reasons you have been
describing, black people may need places of refuge and whites to provide
escape from future betrayals.”463 To which Bell responds: “Even if I knew
for a certainty that whites planned another massive betrayal of blacks, most
whites—and some blacks—would not believe me.”464
B.

Critical of the Rule of Law.

Like Critical Legal Process, Erika remains highly skeptical of the rule
of law while understanding how legal doctrine is created and reformed. Her
insider knowledge of law, as both a lawyer and a liberal law professor’s
daughter, helps her understand how the Master’s favorite tool was used to
build his house. By her own admission, such understanding helps her cut
through legal fictions and get lawmakers to “straighten right up and talk
sense.”465
Immediately before his Erika Wechsler account,466 Bell placed
another story about a black man; a story, the immortal Geneva Crenshaw told
459
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Bell, in which the character was purposefully related to Erika’s story.467 This
story introduced the so-called Last Black Hero. Like Erika, the Last Black
Hero was also a lawyer, “worked in civil rights law for a few years” but
“became frustrated with the law’s proclivity for preserving the status quo
even at the cost of continuing inequities for black people,” and abandoned
hope in the rule of law.468 He “realize[d]—unlike most of [his] civil rights
lawyer friends—that activism more than legal precedent is the key to racial
reform.” The Last Black Hero concluded: “You can’t just talk about, meet
about, and pray about racial discrimination. You have to confront it,
challenge it, do battle” with it.469
Although Bell’s Last Black Hero and Erika Weschler both understood
the Master’s favorite tool and the Master’s house, unlike the Last Black Hero,
as a member of WCBS, Erika is the Master. Erika and her WCBS agreed with
the Last Black Hero’s admonition to confront, challenge, and do battle with
inequality and injustice. Erika, WCBS, the Last Black Hero, and—by
inference—Bell all appeared to turn Thurgood Marshall’s earlier
admonition470 on its head, to save their protesting for the real world and not
the courtroom.
C.

Action through the Legal Process not Revolution.

Critical Legal Process echoes Erika Wechsler and the Last Black
Hero’s desire for concrete action. Concrete action, of course, is not
necessary.471 The common complaint lodged against critical legal movements
as nihilistic is unfounded.472 Before you can resolve a problem, you have to
know that the problem exists. Identifying a problem without offering any
concrete solutions remains a genuine scholarly contribution.
However, Bell appears to disagree. He prefaces his Erika Wechsler
story with a quote from the Book of James in the Bible: “For as the body
without the spirit is dead, so faith without works is dead also.” 473 Mere faith
in critical theory thus would appear to be insufficient to Bell. One must live
467
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that faith through concrete action.
If, however, we take critical legal movements’ pessimistic
assumptions about the Master’s oppression474 seriously, then ironically, the
only viable alternative for concrete action is the rule of law. Critical Legal
Process thus literally or figuratively focuses on using the Master’s favorite
tool to dismantle his house.
Because they agree with Lorde that the Master’s favorite tool, the rule
of law, can never be used to dismantle his house of legal doctrine, 475 Erika
and the Last Black Hero choose to act through potentially violent
revolution.476 If the Master’s oppression is so entrenched and permanent as
Bell argues,477 then nonviolent protest, which relies upon changing public
opinion and the Master’s heart, would be futile.
As Erika and the Last Black Hero both concede, the problem with
violent revolution is that the permanent structural power disparities that
multiple critical legal movements take for granted,478 by their own admission,
doom their violent revolution to failure as well. As the Last Black Hero
explained: “Universal black militance would end black people. Whites could
not stand it.”479 In fact, Bell’s Last Black Hero conceded that his black
militancy was nearly suicidal:
Militant black leadership is like being on a bomb squad. It
474
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requires confidence in your skills and a courage able to
survive the continuing awareness that you’re messing with
dynamite, but that someone has to do it. One mistake, and
you’re gone! Sometimes you’re gone whether or not you make
a mistake.480
At the end of the day, the more radical and pessimistic core
assumptions at the heart of critical legal movements such as Bell’s Racial
Realism481 are just that: unprovable assumptions.482 They are unprovable
because there are simply too many variables to test their veracity. For
example, you either believe, along with Bell and Critical Race Theorists, that
U.S. racism is structurally permanent and impervious to legal reform, or,
along with Wechsler and civil rights advocates, that U.S. racism, while still
present in modern American society, can be lessened through the rule of law.
In the final analysis, core assumptions like the permanence or impermanence
of racism are more about faith than reason or evidence.
As Bell recognized with his critical deconstruction of legal
doctrine,483 for better or worse, many lawmakers and practicing attorneys in
a democracy believe that legal doctrine is the only “real” form of law.484 They
unfairly reject critical theoretical legal scholarship as useless.485 Even if they
refuse to accept critically deconstructed hypothetical legal doctrine seriously
as workable alternatives, they can nevertheless better understand critical legal
theoretical concepts when “translated” into legal doctrine.
Just as identifying the problem is the necessary prerequisite to solving
the problem, Bell’s critical deconstruction of legal doctrine is the necessary
prerequisite to Wechsler’s transformative reconstruction of legal doctrine.
Above all, Critical Legal Process’s willingness to use legal doctrine
symbolically and practically allows people who run the ideological gamut,
from well-intentioned but hesitant incremental law reformers to radical
critical legal theorists disdainful of the rule of law, to work together to
improve the lives of oppressed groups.
480
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CONCLUSION
In another story, The Ultimate Civil Rights Strategy, Bell
acknowledged that the Master’s tool, the rule of law, might be repurposed in
a third way to dismantle the Master’s house.486 The Celestial Curia Sisters,
immortals who resemble the Greek Muses,487 left open the hope that this third
way might work:
“My Curia Sisters,” Geneva [Crenshaw] said, “I . . . confess[]
confusion. You warn us that our legal programs are
foredoomed to failure, and yet you urge us to continue those
very programs because they will create an atmosphere of
protest. I must reiterate my fear that this approach will simply
perpetuate the pattern of benefit to whites of legal reforms
achieved by civil rights litigation intended to help blacks.”
[The Curia responded,] “The benefit they bring to all is
proof of how potent a weapon your civil rights programs can
be in seeking a restructured society. Future campaigns, while
seeking relief in traditional forms, should emphasize the
chasm between the existing social order and the nation’s
ideals. Thus, Sister Geneva, litigation as well as protests and
political efforts would pursue reform directly as well as create
a continuing tension between what you are and what you
might become. Out of this tension may come the insight and
imagination necessary to recast the nation’s guiding principles
closer to the ideal—for all Americans.”488
Tension understandably leaves us uncomfortable. We crave
certainty. Yet with sharply divisive legal and policy issues like race,
tension is what helps us escape our confirmation bias echo chamber and
make better—dare we say—more objective decisions.489
Critical Legal Process seeks to embrace the continuing tension the
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Curia identified—between our ideals and our reality—to find a third way
to improve legal doctrine. In this sense, Critical Legal Process, like both
Bell and Wechsler, cares more about the struggle, the journey, and the
process than the eventual destination or outcome.
In their own way, both Bell and Wechsler admitted that their tasks
ultimately were impossible. In light of the overwhelming power disparity and
structural permanence of racism, real racial progress seemed impossible to
Bell.490 Although Wechsler believed that legal doctrinal reform could limit
racism, Wechsler also agreed that perfect legal doctrine was impossible.491
Wechsler probably would also concede that it is impossible to eradicate
racism.
Both Bell and Wechsler found meaning and significance in—as
American realist Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. stated—wearing your
heart out in pursuit of the unattainable.492 Wechsler’s famous Neutral
Principles address, to which Bell responded, was dedicated to Justice
490
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Holmes.493 Wechsler called himself a “jobbist . . . [c]oncerned with
competence and . . . intellectual integrity in thinking about law and working
about law.”494 Holmes explained about his “imaginary society of jobbists”
that “[t]heir job is their contribution to the general welfare and when a man
is on that, he will do it better the less he thinks either of himself or his
neighbors, and the more he puts all his energy into the problem he has to
solve.”495
For all their considerable ideological disagreement, Bell probably
would agree with Wechsler that he too was a jobbist. When it comes to our
continuing “American Dilemma”496 of race relations and remediation of past
discrimination, we all need to be jobbists.
Although Bell and Wechsler disagreed over the content of Brown’s
neutral principle,497 both were undoubtedly courageous people. Perhaps
Wechsler’s truly neutral principles of law and Bell’s definition of courage
share an overlapping vision. Bell defined courage as “a decision you make to
act in a way that works through your own fear for the greater good as opposed
to pure self-interest. Courage means putting at risk your immediate selfinterest for what you believe is right.”498 Despite his cynicism, Bell
acknowledged that people still respected courage and principle:
I think that there is, even in our bottom-line society—you
know, take care of number one . . . there is a real respect and
a regard for individuals who are willing to act on principle,
whether it turns out to be right or . . . wrong or misguided.499
To Wechsler, a truly neutral principle of law would satisfy Bell’s
definition of courage. Eschewing outcome-determinative self-interest
for the greater good of principled legal doctrine makes for the
courageous rule of law.
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We need the courageous rule of law. Perhaps, like Audre Lorde
claimed, the Master’s tool will never dismantle his house.500 Perhaps the
rule of law will provide only temporary relief but never genuine change.
Only time will tell. In the meantime, we can find solace in Derrick Bell’s
wise words: “[W]e must not forget that it is our duty to keep looking for
an answer, realizing that we may never find it. Our salvation is not in the
discovery, but in the search.”501
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